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Since 2000, the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (“PTO”) has
published nearly all patent applications as they are submitted by
applicants. Scholars and practitioners have praised this practice
for providing timely notice of the potential legal rights the
application may eventually cover. But maximizing timeliness and
transparency in this way can also create significant costs, which
may chill innovation and deter the development and funding of
new research areas. This Article explores these often-unrecognized
costs of publishing unexamined patent applications and proposes
solutions that balance the benefits of early notice with the costs of
patent system uncertainty.
Published patent applications are essentially an initial guess
of what the applicant hopes will become the boundaries of his
intangible private property and a speculative attempt at
demonstrating its possession. Even if they are never granted, these
published applications occupy the patent idea space and can lead
to examination and third-party search errors. Published
applications can thus contribute to costly unpredictability in the
patent system more broadly by preventing others from getting a
patent and by creating a temporary cloud of uncertainty around
what constitutes excludable private property.
Fortunately, there are solutions. Shifting some of the public
notice costs to the applicant can be used to potentially increase the
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quality of information in patent applications, and to reduce the
number of lower quality filings. Alternatively, reform efforts can
focus on providing the applicant and the PTO with more
information in the early stages of examination, enabling them to
make an informed choice about whether an application (or a
portion thereof) is valuable enough to be published.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1999, Congress passed the American Inventors Protection
Act (“AIPA”), which required that all filed patent applications be
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made public in eighteen-months’ time.1 In effect, this meant that the
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (“PTO”) was now in the business
of publishing applications, sometimes years before they are
examined,2 and irrespective of whether they are ever granted.3 This
change was meant to promote notice by informing the public early
in the process about what may emerge from the PTO as a legally
enforceable right after years of examination.4 But with their
amorphous and uncertain scope,5 patent applications often
illegitimately occupy swaths of the patent idea space and create a
chilling effect for other market participants pursuing new
technologies. Congress’s more recent decision in 2011 to switch to
a first-to-file system, which encourages people to run to the Patent
Office with half-baked ideas,6 has the potential to exacerbate this
chilling effect further by increasing the number and decreasing the
quality of published applications.7 The consequence of these

1. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106–113, 113 Stat. 1536,
(1999). Before 2000, only issued patents were published in the United States, while patent
applications remained secret to the public. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD
DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 60, 72 (7th ed. 2017).
Although applicants may opt out of publication if they file in the United States
only, this is not estimated to be a common occurrence. Deepak Hegde & Hong Luo, Patent
Publication and the Market for Ideas 5 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 14-019, 2016),
https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/14-019_dbcea57e-c2d1-4d52-9b64f5c8ec5096bb.pdf (estimating that only a negligible two to five percent of applicants opt out
of publication); Sonja Lück, Benjamin Balsmeier, Florian Seliger & Lee Fleming, Early
Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test, 66 MANAGEMENT SCI. 2677,
2677–85 (2020) (estimating that seven percent of applicants opt out of publication); Stuart
Graham & Deepak Hegde, Disclosing Patents’ Secrets, 347 SCI. 236, 236 (2015) (for applications
from which a patent issued, less than ten percent opted out of publication); Timothy R.
Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 143 (2006) (citing study from 2002
that estimates the opt-out proportion to be eleven percent). It difficult to know for certain
because applications that are abandoned will never publish if the inventor opted out of
initial publication.
2. See infra notes 166–168 and accompanying text.
3. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 1, at 72.
4. See, e.g., Patent Reform and the Patent and Trademark Office Reauthorization for Fiscal
Year 2000: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Cts. & Intell. Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
106th Cong. 59 (1999) (statement of Michael K. Kirk, Executive Director, American,
Intellectual Property Law Association) (the publication requirement “will allow other U.S.
inventors to avoid duplicative research and optimize investment decisions in pursuing
technological development.”); Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent
Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 80 (2004).
5. See infra notes 18–19 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 79–82 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 129–130 and accompanying text.
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changes in stifling research and development is in direct opposition
to the purpose of patent law—promoting innovation.8
Scholars have generally exalted the benefits of publishing
applications for improving notice and assisting with knowledge
diffusion.9 Reform efforts geared towards the notice function of
patent disclosures have heretofore focused primarily on granted
patents: the consequences to innovation of having insufficiently
substantiated disclosures in granted patents10 and the
unpredictable way in which granted claims (which succinctly
describe the legal outer boundaries of the invention in the patent
document) are later interpreted.11 There has been no in-depth

8. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1591 (2003); FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT
NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 1 (2011) [hereinafter FTC REPORT],
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/evolving-ip-marketplacealigning-patent-notice-and-remedies-competition-report-federal-trade/110307patentreport.pdf
(“The goal of the patent system is to promote innovation . . . .”). Some scholars argue that
patent law is also meant to promote disclosure of useful inventions. See, e.g., Jeanne C.
Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 539 (2009); Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the
Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 745 (2012) (“A traditional subsidiary justification for
patent law is to encourage the disclosure of new inventions to the world.”).
9. In fact, scholars even argue that applications should be published immediately
upon filing in view of these benefits. See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, Opening the Patent System:
Diffusionary Levers in Patent Law, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 793, 848 (2016); Lisa Larrimore
Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 597 (2012). But
see Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
401, 423 (2010) (“[D]isclosure comes at considerable benefit to innovators’ rivals and for that
reason, disclosure is a source of disutility for the original inventors themselves.”). Some
argue that all exceptions to publishing, such as requests for non-publication, should be
eliminated entirely. See Lemley & Moore, supra note 4, at 108–09.
10. Janet Freilich, Ignoring Information Quality, FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2021)
(manuscript at 22–26), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3739123
(discussing the consequences of erroneous patent rejections and grants based on incorrect
patent disclosures); Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 919, 975
(2011) (discussing examiners’ use of “chaff” in prior art patent documents to reject legitimate
applications); Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS
L.J. 65, 116 (2009) (discussing how early filing leads to poor quality disclosures, introducing
uncertainty of claim scope in granted patents).
11. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008); Jason Rantanen, The
Malleability of Patent Rights, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 895, 899 (2015) (“[P]atent rights are
malleable . . . the very rights themselves can be altered by the actors who interact with the
issued patent.”); Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REV. 523, 525 (2010)
(“[A] patentee is permitted to change his claims throughout the life of the patent, generally
at-will with few substantive limits.”); Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and
Notice Externalities, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (2013); FTC REPORT, supra note 8, at 56.
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discussion of the unique harms to innovation caused by the
publication of unexamined applications.
Published applications, even those that are later abandoned and
potentially of dubious quality,12 are now often used as evidence
(called “prior art”) by examiners to prevent others from getting a
patent.13 And the inchoate scope of published applications during
their pendency can create a cloud of legal uncertainty for other
innovators attempting to pursue research in that space. Both of
these effects additionally create a perverse incentive for applicants
to “pollute” the patent idea space—to purposefully create a
temporary cloud of uncertainty in the pending patent idea space14
or to permanently occupy the prior art idea space.15 Uncertainty of
the scope of published applications—as prior art or as a pending
legal right—undermines the ability of patent law to reward
invention16—by denying patents to proper claimants—and to
incentivize efficient commercialization of nascent technologies17
—by hindering efforts of third parties to determine what
constitutes “private property” in the idea space.
Recognition of these harms also supplies unique reform
proposals. Examiners can cite to any part of an application as soon
as it publishes, without waiting to see if it becomes a granted
patent. And, in view of the inchoate nature of the document, market
participants may be forced to analyze the entire patent document,
not just the initial claims filed by the applicant, when considering
12. Although some applications are abandoned because the inventor runs out of
money, which would not necessarily indicate a poor-quality disclosure.
13. Prior art is the universe of public disclosures (usually published patents and patent
applications) made before the patent was filed. It is used by examiners to show that a claimed
invention is not patentable because it is not novel or non-obvious over the prior art. 35 U.S.C.
§§ 102–03. For simplicity, I am disregarding other forms of evidence that examiners can but
rarely do use, such as non-patent literature or evidence of prior sales or public use of an
invention. See Greg Reilly, The Complicated Relationship of Patent Examination and Invalidation,
69 AM. U. L. REV. 1095, 1130, 1132 (2020); see also infra notes 32, 114.
14. Pending patent idea (or disclosure) space is a technological information space that
consists of pending applications, still enforceable patents, and the remaining space free to
use without legal encumbrances.
15. Prior art disclosure (or idea) space is occupied by published patents, published
applications, and the remaining space not occupied by those documents. I am ignoring other
types of non-patent prior art for simplicity.
16. A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents—The Not-Quite-Holy Grail,
71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267, 275–77 (1996) (discussing the reward theory of patent law).
17. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265,
266 (1977) (introducing prospect theory of patent law).
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its potential legal impact.18 Thus, the entire disclosure of a patent
application—the claims, the specification, and the figures—serves
to occupy the patent idea space when it publishes and defines the
application’s “scope.”19 Accordingly, reforms must take into
account the uncertainty created by the entire application document.
The point of publication also becomes critical. The time before
publication, before any party can rely on that information, is when
changes can still be made. Changes that would not only improve
the quality of granted patents, but also would reduce the unique
harms caused by publishing applications. The patent system’s
current practice of fixing the disclosure (apart from the claims) at
the time of filing is not inexorable. We can instead choose to publish
and give legal weight to a subset of what is filed by the applicant.
With these considerations in mind, I suggest instituting prepublication cost-shifting and examination measures to force patent
applicants to internalize some of the harms of their “notice
pollution”20 and to reduce the uncertainty of what (if anything) is
ultimately published. Although private parties can (and often do)
individually hire lawyers to monitor the published patent idea
space for threats, it is more efficient if at least some of the work is
accomplished by the agency responsible for screening such
documents in the first place—the lowest-cost avoider21—the PTO.22
Reforms should consider ways to increase the cost of this pollution,
to either prevent the applicant from polluting at all (by
incentivizing some applicants to abandon their application before
18. Jason Rantanen, Patent Law’s Disclosure Requirement, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 369, 370
(2013) (the disclosure “limits the potential scope of what the applicant can claim.”); Gentry
Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[C]laims may be no
broader than the supporting disclosure . . . .”).
19. By “scope,” I refer to the area that a patent application (as a whole, not just the
claims) occupies in disclosure (or idea) space, be it the space of pending disclosures (which
includes pending applications and still enforceable patents) or the prior art disclosure space,
which includes all published patents or applications (including pending and enforceable
ones). See infra Section II.A.
20. Menell & Meurer, supra note 11, at 5 (coining a similar concept of “notice externality”).
21. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 41 (1960) (introducing the
concept of lowest-cost avoider in the pollution context).
22. Reilly, supra note 13, at 1121 (“[G]iven the sheer volume of patenting activity and
the difficulty in ascertaining claim scope, competitors in many industries do not have
incentives to even monitor each other’s patent applications . . . .”); Robert P. Merges, As Many
as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System
Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 599–600 (1999) (listing reasons a “public patent authority”
may be a cheapest cost avoider).
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publication) or reduce the amount of emitted pollutant (by
requiring applicants to narrow their application, including the
specification, before publication).
Part I of this paper provides background information about the
patent examination process. It also summarizes the reasons why
even granted patents create legal uncertainty. Part II explains why
published patent applications have exacerbated this uncertainty. In
particular, I discuss how the unique notice problems created by
published applications have affected (1) examination—where a
patent examiner needs to determine whether a new patent
application23 should be granted in view of all other published
patent documents in existence, and (2) freedom-to-operate
searches—where a potential innovator attempts to figure out their
legal rights to pursue a new research project. Finally, Part III
addresses the tradeoff we have made in our patent system between
the timeliness and transparency of notice provided by patent
applications (i.e., benefits) versus the quality of such notice (i.e., costs).
This Part also suggests some balancing considerations for reform.
I. PATENT UNCERTAINTY
This Part first provides background information about the
patent examination process. It then discusses the reasons why
granted patents create legal uncertainty and notice failures.
A. Nuts and Bolts of Patent Examination
Patent examination proceeds as follows. A patent application,
with an initial set of claims, along with the written disclosure and
figures is filed with the PTO.24 The written disclosure
(“specification”25) describes the invention with figures, text, and
often examples of how the invention may operate in practice.26 The
claims at the end of the document delineate what the inventor
believes to be the metes and bounds (i.e., outer periphery) of

23. “New” here means it is the first filing of that application with the PTO. No
continuations have yet been filed from this application.
24. 37 C.F.R. § 1.51(b).
25. To avoid confusion, I include drawings in that term, and exclude claims.
26. 37 C.F.R. § 1.71(a) (“The specification must include a written description of the
invention or discovery and of the manner and process of making and using the same . . . .”).
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the invention.27 The PTO publishes this application as filed, without
any substantive changes.28
At some point, usually over a year after filing,29 and many
months after publication,30 substantive examination commences,
wherein an examiner determines whether the claims and disclosure
meet the statutory criteria for patentability.31 The examiner
searches the “prior art”—most often other published applications
and granted patents32—to determine whether the claimed
invention is new and not obvious in view of what has already been
done before the filing date.33 The examiner also determines if the
written description contains sufficient detail to support the scope
of the claimed invention.34
Most commonly, the examiner issues a “rejection” based on this
initial analysis, asserting that the applicant’s claims failed to fulfill

27. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (“[C]laims [should] particularly point[] out and distinctly
claim[] the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.”).
28. 37 CFR § 1.211 (requiring publication at a maximum of eighteen months after
filing); see also U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
§ 2120.III
(9th
ed.
revision
10.2019,
June
2020)
[hereinafter
MPEP],
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/ (listing only formalities required for a
“complete” application).
29. Patents Data, at a Glance February 2022, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off.,
https://www.uspto.gov/dashboard/patents/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2022) [hereinafter PTO
Dashboard] (listing current pendency as 18.1 months to first substantive action by examiner).
30. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
31. The general criteria for patentability are novelty and nonobviousness over the
prior art. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–03. An examiner must also determine whether the specification
meets the requirements of written description and enablement. Id. at § 112(a) (“The
specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to make and use the same . . . .”).
32. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-479, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENT
OFFICE SHOULD STRENGTHEN SEARCH CAPABILITIES AND BETTER MONITOR EXAMINERS’ WORK
16 (June 2016), https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/678149.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT]
(discussing examiner limitations with searching nonpatent literature); id. at 17 (“8 of the 18
experts we interviewed suggested examiners focus on searching patent literature and may
not thoroughly search nonpatent literature. Similarly, our survey results . . . show that nearly
all examiners always or often search for U.S. patents and applications (an estimated 99
percent); we also found that nearly all examiners always or often view this as the most
relevant type of art they consider (an estimated 98 percent of examiners).”
33. Supra note 31.
34. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (“The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise,
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . . to make
and use the same . . . .”). I will later refer to these as “scope-limiting” disclosure doctrines.
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one of the requirements of patentability.35 In response to these
rejections, the applicant often amends the claims to avoid covering
the prior art or to otherwise make them patentable.36 Applicants
cannot amend the rest of the written description, however, and
instead must narrow the claims if the disclosure as originally filed
fails to provide the requisite detail to support the claim scope.37 If
the examiner eventually agrees that the most recent set of proposed
claims meets the requirements for a patent,38 the patent issues for a
twenty-year term.39 After issuance, the patent publishes with the
same written disclosure already published in the application,40 but
now with the finalized set of legally enforceable claims.
B. Sources of Uncertainty in Granted Patents
The sources of uncertainty in granted patents can be broken
down into two main categories: the legal framework that influences
how patent disclosures are written, and weaknesses in how certain
legal requirements are enforced during examination. The difficulty
in discerning which parts of the written disclosure actually
demonstrate “possession” of an invention41—the rightful
occupation of the patent idea space—or in anticipating the scope of
any claims that may originate from that disclosure, leads to a
variety of problems. In particular, the uncertainty makes it difficult
to search for and analyze relevant patent documents—be it for prior
art purposes by examiners or for freedom-to-operate purposes by
third parties (i.e., looking to avoid legal encumbrances in a new
technology area). These two searching problems are also ones most
35. Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examining Patent Examination, 2010 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 2, 7 (2010) (“86.5% of the PTO’s first office actions were non-final rejections.”).
36. Id. at 12 (“[T]he vast majority of applicants, particularly the applicants who obtain
patents and those who are still actively trying to do so, do so in part by amending their claims
in response to examiner concerns.”).
37. Kristen Osenga, The Shape of Things to Come: What We Can Learn from Patent Claim
Length, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 617, 623 (2012) (“The specification is
essentially set at the time of filing, whereas the claims can be amended during
patent prosecution.”).
38. Issuing a “notice of allowance.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.311(a).
39. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
40. See supra note 37.
41. “[P]ossession . . . serves to demarcate that which is yours and that which is
someone else’s” and is demonstrated through the disclosure for intangible property by
demonstrating that “the author can actually make a functioning device” based on that
disclosure. Holbrook, supra note 1, at 146–47.
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exacerbated and magnified by the addition of published patent
applications to the idea space, as discussed in more detail in Part II.
1. Legal Framework
Uncertainty is baked into patent documents because of how
legal rights are defined in patent law, as well as how they are
acquired.42 The legally enforceable scope of granted patents, and
how they can be used as prior art, are often uncertain because
patents have long, sweeping, abstract disclosures and broadly
worded claims.
a. The nature of claims. In our patent system, the granted claims
at the end of the patent document describe the legal scope43 of what
the inventor can exclude others from doing.44 But the very nature
of claims can lead to notice failures and uncertainty.45 Claims do
not simply describe the “core” of the invention or provide an
example of it46—they have to define the boundaries of the
invention, independently from what may be in the written
disclosure and figures.47 Thus, although the specification helps
“inform” what claim terms mean,48 and must contain enough detail

42. Of course, a fundamental uncertainty of language underlies most legal documents,
but that is beyond the scope of this paper.
43. The scope of the patent is “how much intellectual space resides within the metes
and bounds of the patent claims.” Janet Freilich, The Uninformed Topography of Patent Scope,
19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 150, 161 (2015).
44. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 81 S. Ct. 599, 600–01 (1961)
(“[C]laims made in the patent are the sole measure of the grant.”); see also 1 ERNEST
BAINBRIDGE LIPSCOMB, PATENT CLAIMS § 1:3 (3d ed. 2020).
45. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 762
(2009) (“But despite the assertion that peripheral claims provide clear ex ante content notice
to the public, there is a robust stream of criticism undermining this conclusion.”).
46. See Andres Sawicki, The Central Claiming Renaissance, 103 CORNELL L. REV.
645, 657 (2018).
47. 1 LIPSCOMB, supra note 44.
48. “[T]he specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis.
Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’”
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Vitronics Corp. v.
Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); see also Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech
Sys., Inc., 357 F.3d 1340, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Although it is improper to read a limitation
from the specification into the claims, ‘[c]laims must be read in view of the specification, of
which they are a part.’”(quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)).
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to support the full scope of the claims,49 the claims are not limited
to what is specifically described. For example, in determining what
the term “baffles” in a claim for vandalism-resistant walls means,
one can look to the examples provided in the written description of
how baffles can be used.50 If the description provides examples of
baffles deflecting projectiles, providing structural support, and
creating compartments, the term can be interpreted broadly as any
“load-bearing objects that serve to check, impede, or obstruct flow.”51
“The overall goal [of applicants] . . . is to make [claims] as broad
as the Patent Office will allow.”52 Claims limited to the exact
disclosed embodiment53—the manner in which the invention was
expressed in the specification—would be very limiting.54 In order
to “capture” an infringer’s version of your invention in the claim
scope55 (and thus be able to exclude them from it), claims have to
be drafted in abstract terms to encompass a variety of physical
manifestations of the inventive idea.56
This attempt to capture the maximum amount of breadth leads
to claims that are written at high levels of abstraction or in
functional terms. For example, a “clip” would be claimed as a
“fastening means.” To provide support for such claims, the written
disclosure would also be filled with such phrases. Such abstract and

49. Tun-Jen Chiang, The Levels of Abstraction Problem in Patent Law, 105 NW. U. L. REV.
1097, 1113 (2011).
50. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1309.
51. Id. at 1325.
52. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 1, at 32; see also Freilich, supra note 43, at 152.
53. Embodiments are versions of an invention. See Gene Quinn, Tricks & Tips to
Describe an Invention in a Patent Application, IP WATCHDOG (Dec. 26, 2015),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/12/26/tricks-tips-for-describe-an-invention-in-apatent-application-2/id=64133/. An embodiment is “a manner in which an invention can be
made, used, practiced or expressed.” Glossary, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off.,
https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/glossary#sec-E (last visited Mar. 18, 2022).
54. Chiang, supra note 49, at 1115 (“If patent scope is limited to those embodiments
that the patentee could build at the time of filing (and thus teach in the specification), then
every patent becomes worthless practically from the moment it is issued.”).
55. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 1, at 33–34; Freilich, supra note 43, at 152 (“[A] patent’s
scope is generally thought of as the universe of later-developed products that infringe on
the patent.”).
56. Claims “cover[] a class of embodiments that share only some operating principle
or functional idea.” Chiang, supra note 49, at 1119; see also Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal
Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1169 (2008).
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functional language is harder to understand57 and the scope of
functional claims is harder to predict as it is not constrained by a
particular structure.58
b. Continuation practice. Another quirk in our patent system also
leads to vague claims and sweeping written descriptions—the
filing of continuation applications. Any time during examination of
a patent application at the Patent Office (i.e., while it is “pending”),
the applicant can file one or more “continuation applications” with
new claims.59 The continuation application has the same
specification as the original application and dates back to the filing
date of the original application.60 By strategically having an
application pending, an applicant can keep filing an infinite
number of claims, for up to twenty years, based on the originally
filed disclosure.
Applicants file continuing applications for a variety of reasons:
to avoid prior art during prosecution,61 to cover new
implementations the inventors discovered after filing,62 to make the
claims more likely to withstand a validity challenge in litigation,63

57. Fromer, supra note 45, at 762 (comparing “shoelace” to the abstract definition of
“mechanism by which to bind tightly around the foot”); see Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching
Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 638–41 nn.89–90 (2010).
58. Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 WIS. L.
REV. 905, 905 (2012); Arti K. Rai, Improving (Software) Patent Quality Through the Administrative
Process, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 503, 518–19 (2013) (“[I]f software designers actually want to do
freedom-to-operate searches for patents, such patents would probably be easier to search
(and certainly to understand) if some structure—for example, a detailed algorithm—were
included in the specification.”). Functional claiming is an especially big problem in certain
fields, like software, where structure is not an inherent part of the technology. Kevin
Emerson Collins, Patent Law’s Functionality Malfunction and the Problem of Overbroad,
Functional Software Patents, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1399, 1402 (2013) (“Software is a powerful
technology precisely because it has been engineered at a deep level to ensure that the
specification of functional properties does not require the specification of any physical,
structural properties.”).
59. 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2018); MPEP, supra note 28, § 201.07; Cotropia, supra note 10,
at 101–02.
60. Id.
61. See Osenga, supra note 37, at 620 (discussing amending claims to overcome prior art).
62. Cotropia, supra note 10, at 102–03.
63. Osenga, supra note 37, at 623 (discussing amending claims to comply with changes
in patent law).
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or to cover a competitor’s product.64 For an example of the abuse
such continuations allow, consider the case of Rambus Inc. v.
Infineon Technologies AG, 318 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In 1990,
Rambus filed a very broad disclosure on computer memory
technology.65 In 1992, Rambus joined a standard-setting
organization that was developing new technological standards for
computer memory to be adopted by its members.66 By attending the
organization’s meetings, Rambus was able to gather information
about what computer memory standard the organization would
select, and to write new claims that captured the standards set by
this organization.67 Using continuation practice, Rambus was able
to date these new claims back to its 1990 filing.68 Rambus then left
the organization in 1996 and sued one of the organization’s
members for using those very same standards set by the
organization, as captured by its new claims drafted using insider
knowledge.69 Continuation practice almost seemed to give Rambus
the powers of time travel—to go back in time and invest in the right
technology that others would later adopt.
This example demonstrates how continuation practice makes it
hard to predict what claims will originate from a patent document.
Because applicants cannot add “new matter” to the disclosure after
filing, there is an incentive to add as much possible detail (however
speculative) in the originally filed specification and to cover as
much idea space as possible to leave room to file future
continuation applications.70 These overlong and sweeping
64. Menell & Meurer, supra note 11, at 14 (“[A] patent applicant gains from being able
to update her claims as competitors introduce new products, thereby improving the
likelihood that the competitor falls within the scope of the claimed invention.”); id.
(“Nonpracticing entities in the patent world benefit from the difficulty that the developers
face in searching the millions of patents and patent claims.”).
65. Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1084 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
66. Id. at 1085–86.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1086; see also Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Patent Deception in Standard Setting: The
Case for Antitrust Policy 6 (Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law, Paper No. 1774, 2008),
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1774.
70. Amy R. Motomura explains: “To facilitate later mining of the disclosure . . .
original patent applicants are incentivized to use broad, vague language and include
undeveloped, speculative post-filing innovation in the original patent application . . . .
[which] can obscure the actual invention and contribute to the opacity of patent
disclosures . . . .” Amy R. Motomura, Innovation and Own Prior Art, 72 HASTINGS L. J. 565, 599
(2021); see also Cotropia, supra note 10, at 102–03.
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disclosures create uncertainty not just in the context of continuation
practice, but also in their use as prior art.71 These problems of
overdisclosure have even more significance when juxtaposed with
the publication of unexamined applications, as explored in Part II.
c. Constructive reduction to practice. Patents also have significant
amounts of speculative information. Granted claims and parts of
written disclosures can illegitimately occupy areas of patent idea
space—both the prior art idea space and the pending patent idea
space—that the inventor never actually possessed.72 For an
egregious example, consider the fact that the Patent Office granted
Theranos a patent based on its fraudulent technology claiming to
perform broad-range diagnostic tests based on mere finger pricks
of blood.73 In fact, this Theranos patent is still being enforced in
infringement lawsuits today.74
The reason Theranos was able to get a patent on its fake
invention is because an applicant can mentally conceive of an
invention without physically performing it and can
“constructively” reduce it to practice by filing a patent
application.75 Thus, Theranos simply submitted its idea of using
microliters of blood for broad-range testing, without verifying that
it was in fact possible with its technology. Effectively, an applicant
can simply provide hypothetical “prophetic examples” in the
application to speculate about how the invention would work in
practice to satisfy the disclosure requirements of patentability.76
And, there’s little punishment for bad guesses since claims can
71. Few commentators have recognized the fact that the quality of patents is also
important in how it is later used as prior art. See Freilich, supra note 10, at 22–26; Seymore,
supra note 10, at 975.
72. See supra note 41.
73. U.S. Patent No. 8,283,155 (issued Oct. 9, 2012); Theranos Founder and Former Chief
Operating Officer Charged in Alleged Wire Fraud Schemes, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (June 15, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/theranos-founder-and-former-chief-operatingofficer-charged-alleged-wire-fraud-schemes (“[D]efendants claimed the analyzer was able to
perform a full range of clinical tests using small blood samples drawn from a finger stick.”).
74. Labrador Diagnostics LLC v. BioFire Diagnostics LLC, No. 1:20-cv-00348 (D. Del.
Mar. 9, 2020).
75. Seymore, supra note 57, at 628–29.
76. Janet Freilich, Prophetic Patents, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663, 666 (2019) (“The Patent
and Trademark Office (‘PTO’) and the courts explicitly permit made-up experiments and
fictional data in patents”); Seymore, supra note 57, at 631. But see Dmitry Karshtedt, Mark A.
Lemley & Sean B. Seymore, The Death of the Genus Claim, 35 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 41 (2021)
(inoperable embodiments do not always lead to undue experimentation).
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encapsulate inoperative embodiments without being rendered
invalid.77 According to Janet Freilich’s recent work, thirty-eight
percent of chemistry and biology applications filed between 2001
and 2017 had at least one prophetic example in the specification.78
d. First-to-file system. Our switch to a first-to-file system in 2011
increased the amount of speculation already present in patents.79
Previously, patent applicants could back-date their filings to the
time of actual invention, and thus worried a little less about the date
someone else may have filed a similar application.80 Under first-tofile, the filing date is all that matters, and no amount of evidence
will give you an earlier date of invention.81 Applicants are now
rewarded for filing an application as soon as possible—before they
have fully developed the idea or have found the money or time to
write it up properly. They race to the patent office to get priority for
claiming the invention over later filers and, by definition, to limit
the universe of prior art that can be used by the examiner to
invalidate their patent.82
Patent law provides little downside to filing an application
early in the innovation process. Applications remain secret for
eighteen months and can remain unpublished forever if the
applicant chooses to abandon the application before that time is
up.83 In addition, constructive reduction to practice allows
applicants to file vague or speculative disclosures.84 Thus, an
77. Seymore, supra note 57, at 632 n.54 (“According to the Federal Circuit, claims are
not necessarily invalid if they encompass inoperative embodiments . . . .”).
78. Freilich, supra note 76, at 697. This can lead to what Janet Freilich calls “innovation
dead zone[s,]” where no other inventor can get a patent “in an area previously described by
a prophetic patent.” Id. at 669.
79. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29 (2011) (revising 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)); Mark A. Lemley, Ready for Patenting, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1181 (2016) (“The goal of
the move to (mostly) first-to-file, besides harmonization, is to encourage inventors to proceed
with alacrity to share their invention with the world.”).
80. Cotropia, supra note 10, at 79 (describing how you may “swear behind” a prior art
reference to get an earlier date of invention than your filing date).
81. Id. at 82 (“[Under a first-to-file system,] the filing date, not the date of invention,
determines priority amongst competing inventors.”).
82. Id. at 78–79, 82 (“Essentially, the level of technological progress the invention is
compared against becomes lower the earlier the date of comparison.”).
83. Id. at 99 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 122).
84. See supra Section I.B.1.c; see also Cotropia, supra note 10, at 74–75 (discussing the
low threshold for meeting the disclosure requirements of patentability); Seymore, supra note
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inventor does not immediately give up trade secret protection by
filing an application early, nor does he significantly risk the validity
of the later-issued patent by filing mere guesswork. In the face of
uncertainty about the value of an invention and what competitors
are working on,85 it makes sense for an applicant to choose to keep
their options open86 and to file the application in the early stage of
its development.
Early filing of applications results in written disclosures that are
vague, rambling, and speculative because the inventors themselves
are not sure, at the beginning of the inventive process, exactly
which implementations of their ideas will work87 or whether the
idea is even any good.88 The granted claims are also likely poorly
supported by these disclosures.89 Early filing, along with the highthroughput filing scheme of many IP-generating firms,90 means
that patent applications will be not only speculative, but generally
uninformative and poorly written.
2. Enforcement Issues
Patent applicants have great incentive to keep as much of their
invention secret as possible, while simultaneously claiming the
broadest scope of protection. That way, they can get the benefit of
suing competitors without entirely losing the advantages of trade
secret (i.e., without providing competitors sufficient information to

57, at 639 & n.87 (doubts about enablement are resolved in the patentee’s favor during
litigation and prosecution).
85. Cotropia, supra note 10, at 97–98.
86. Id. at 98.
87. See Lemley, supra note 79, at 1192 (“One concern with early filing is that the very
inventors who do not build products will draft the broadest claims, simply because they
don’t actually know what particular implementations of their idea will work.”).
88. Cotropia, supra note 10, at 110 (“[E]arly filing leads to more bets—option
purchases by way of patent filings—that go bad and have no payout because they cover
inventions not worth commercializing.”).
89. Id. at 116 (discussing how early filing leads to poor quality disclosures, introducing
uncertainty of claim scope in granted patents).
90. Jeremy W. Bock, Patent Quantity, 38 U. HAW. L. REV. 287, 306–08 (2016) (discussing
reasons why firms accumulate patents, including employee compensation structures and the
firms’ defensive uses of large patent portfolios). In such firms, inventors are not intrinsically
motivated to create intellectual property for their company and patent attorneys are paid
little per patent application. Id. The result is weak applications—those with little detail or
experimental verification.
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reproduce a viable imitation).91 The desire for expansive claims and
limiting (or hiding) information in the specification naturally leads
to applications with broadly worded, vague (and often functional)
claims and specifications that hide the ball—making it difficult to
assess the scope of protectable intellectual space.
Courts and the PTO have grappled with how to compensate for
applicants’ incentives to sow uncertainty and the unpredictability
bolstered by the nature of claims, continuation practice, and
constructive reduction to practice. They have developed scopelimiting disclosure doctrines meant to constrain the breadth of
claims and to force applicants to provide support in the
specification. But as I discuss here, those substantive doctrines are
often unpredictable in outcome and difficult to apply, especially for
examiners ex ante.
One reason speculative claims can be granted in patents is the
way possession of the invention—by way of disclosure—is
evaluated by the courts.92 In theory, “the patent applicant must
demonstrate in the specification to ‘any person skilled in the
[relevant] art [how] . . . to make and use the [invention]’ without
‘undue experimentation.’”93 Applying this “enablement” doctrine
in practice, however, is “challenging from a technical, legal, and
conceptual perspective; and there are rarely easy answers.”94
Consequently, as scholars have noted, “[t]he PTO does
notoriously little examination or rejection based on enablement.”95
Examiners have to go the extra mile to reject an application based

91. See Fromer, supra note 8, at 552–53 & n.65.
92. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 1, at 252, 289.
93. Fromer, supra note 8, at 546 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112 and Monsanto Co. v. Syngenta
Seeds, Inc., 503 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
94. Rantanen, supra note 11, at 924–25. I am disregarding a related requirement of
written description, which has similar enforcement problems. The problems in enforcement
of these doctrines, based on 35 U.S.C. § 112, have also been empirically observed: the
proportion of examiner rejections based on these doctrines has not changed significantly
over time, despite changes in legal doctrines that should have made it easier for examiners
to make such rejections. See Colleen V. Chien, Nicholas Halkowski, Maria He & Rodney
Swartz, Parsing the Impact of Alice and the PEG, 2020 PATENTLY-O PATENT L.J. 20, 25 (2020),
https://patentlyo.com/media/2020/11/PatentlyO-LJ-2020-11-02.pdf (showing a lack of
significant change in § 112 rejections for computer-implemented technologies despite
changes in the law and PTO guidance that lowered the threshold for making such rejections).
95. Karshtedt et al., supra note 76, at 97; see also Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 625, 668 (2002) (“Most of the assertions made by a patent applicant are taken on faith;
only rarely does the PTO seek verification of a patent applicant’s assertions.”).
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on this requirement. The use of prophetic examples alone does not
raise red flags about enablement.96 Disclosures are presumed to be
enabled and adequate, with the examiner bearing the burden of
proving otherwise.97
There is another doctrine that is meant to constrain claim
scope—indefiniteness.98 It requires that “claims particularly point[]
out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter which the inventor . . .
regards as the invention.”99 This doctrine is meant to limit the
vagueness of claims which may artificially increase the “zone of
uncertainty” around the claimed language.100 In theory, the PTO
has a high standard for this requirement, finding claims indefinite
if they have “more than one reasonable interpretation.”101

96. See Seymore, supra note 57, at 631. It is not clear whether prophetic examples weigh
against you in an enablement analysis. Janet Freilich, supra note 76, at 680 (“The Wands
factors, which embody the seminal test for enablement, list the presence or absence of
‘working examples’ as a factor in the analysis, but omit prophetic examples.” (citing In re
Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988))).
97. Seymore, supra note 57, at 630.
98. A related doctrine of § 112(f) has recently been expanded in its ability to limit
functional claim limitations to the disclosed structure. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792
F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc). Some scholars believe that there are still fundamental
limitations in its applicability. Kevin Emerson Collins, The Williamson Revolution in
Software’s Structure, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1597, 1628–29 (2016) (Williamson is not sufficient
to resolve the problem with functional claiming in software patents since what constitutes
“structure” in a software patent is still unsettled.).
99. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (emphasis added).
100. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 899 (2014) (“[A] patent must
be precise enough to afford clear notice of what is claimed, . . . in a manner that avoids ‘[a]
zone of uncertainty which enterprise and experimentation may enter only at the risk of
infringement claims.’” (quoting United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236
(1942))).
101. MPEP, supra note 28, § 2173.02.I; U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Supplementary
Examination Guidelines for Determining Compliance with 35 U.S.C. 112 and for Treatment
of Related Issues in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 7162, 7164 (Feb. 9, 2011) (“[A] lower
threshold of ambiguity is applied during prosecution.” (citing Ex parte Miyazaki, 89 USPQ2d
1207, 1212 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 2008))).
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In practice, however, examiners, already strapped for time102, are
unlikely to make indefiniteness rejections.103
In sum, the weak enforcement of the scope-limiting doctrines
described above fails to counterbalance the applicant’s natural
tendencies to claim broadly and describe little. This results in
overbroad, abstract claims that cover more than the applicant in
fact possessed. Moreover, these doctrines are only targeted at
making sure granted claims are of proper breadth. There is no legal
doctrine that polices speculative or inaccurate information in the
unclaimed parts of the written disclosure. But those parts of the
patent document can still be used as prior art to invalidate other
applications or to support new claims in future continuation
applications. Poor disclosure quality in granted patents can
therefore be harmful.104 But the effects of overdisclosure and weak
enforcement of scope-limiting doctrines on innovation become
even more critical when juxtaposed with our current practice of
publishing unexamined applications, as discussed next.
II. HOW PATENT APPLICATIONS EXACERBATE PATENT SYSTEM
UNCERTAINTY
The publication of patent applications has exacerbated the
problems addressed above. In addition to published patents, which
have unclear and poorly supported claim scope, the patent idea
space is now occupied with unexamined applications. Published
applications—even those that are later abandoned and potentially
of dubious quality—are often used during examination to prevent
others from getting a patent. The inchoate scope of published
applications during their pendency can also create a cloud of legal
uncertainty for other innovators attempting to pursue research in
that space. I will first explain how the uncertainty of an
102. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Irrational Ignorance at the Patent Office,
72 VAND. L. REV. 975, 978 (2019) (“On average, a U.S. patent examiner spends only eighteen
hours reviewing an application, which includes reading the application, searching for prior
art, comparing the prior art with the application, writing a rejection, responding to the patent
applicant’s arguments, and often conducting an interview with the applicant’s attorney.”).
103. See James Cosgrove, § 112 Rejections: Where They Are Found and How Applicants Handle
Them, IP WATCHDOG (May 9, 2017), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/05/09/112-rejectionsapplicants-handle/id=82668/#:~:text=While%20interviews%20are%20usually%20the,(b)
%20rejections%2C%20respectively (showing indefiniteness rejections are made in only twenty-one
percent of all applications, while rejections based on prior art are made eighty percent of the time).
104. See supra note 71.

1581

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:5 (2022)

application’s “scope” can change over time. I will then discuss how
the existence of published applications affects examination and
freedom-to-operate searches.
A. Uncertainty of Patent Applications Over Time
An unexamined published application is initially at the apex of
its information uncertainty. The originally filed claims are likely too
broad, covering ideas already in the public domain, because many
applicants do not perform any prior art search before filing an
application.105 In addition, because applicants have an infinite
number of opportunities to amend the claims during
examination,106 they have little to lose in filing overbroad claims at
the beginning of the process. 107
The infinite ability to amend claims also means that the legally
enforceable rights that may stem from an application are inchoate.
Simply looking at the initially filed claims provides little
information as the claims can easily change. The main limiting
factor in what may be claimed from the application thus stems from
the written disclosure and figures that are filed with the claims.108
The claims, written disclosure, and figures together define the
“application scope” or “disclosure scope” of the filed application.

105. See Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 179, 200 (2007) (“[B]ecause the applicant is not required to search for prior art, the
initial claims represent what the patentee thinks might be novel and nonobvious.”); Bhaven
N. Sampat, When Do Applicants Search for Prior Art, 53 J.L. & ECON. 399, 401–02 (2010)
(providing empirical evidence that, “in many cases, applicants do not conduct even cursory
searches for prior art”); IAIN M. COCKBURN & REBECCA HENDERSON, SURVEY RESULTS FROM
THE 2003 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION SURVEY ON STRATEGIC
MANAGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY F.8–.9 (2003) [hereinafter IPO Report],
http://www.ipo.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&Template=/CM/ContentDispla
y.cfm&ContentFileID=55152 (seventeen percent of responding corporations spent less than
one hour, if any, on a patent search before filing an application).
106. As long as they keep paying fees, applicants can keep filing amendments. See 37
C.F.R. § 1.114 (after final rejection, the applicant can pay a fee and “request
continued examination”).
107. Jonathan A. Barney, A Study of Patent Mortality Rates: Using Statistical Survival
Analysis to Rate and Value Patent Assets, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 317, 328 (2002) (“A patent is not unlike
an expensive lottery ticket; you pay your money up front and hope for the big payoff.”).
Applicants are also more likely to file indefinite claims, creating fuzzier boundaries, as they
can always be amended to be more definite.
108. See supra note 37.
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As shown in Figure 1 below, the uncertainty of a new109
application’s scope is highest when filed. Not only are the claims
likely too broad, but the specification is probably written in
sweeping, vague terms, or perhaps with too many proposed
variations of the invention to support the abstract claim language
or the potential claim amendments which may be required in
response to examiner rejections.110
After filing (and publication), the uncertainty of the
application’s scope shrinks as examination progresses, at least in
certain dimensions. As time goes on, and an application is
examined, more clarity can be gleaned—about what certain terms
mean, what the applicant intends to protect, and the scope of the
legal right the application can legitimately capture. With
examination, applicants get the benefit of an examiner’s search
identifying other occupants of the same idea sub-space and are
forced to reevaluate the scope of their invention that can actually
be supported by the specification. Thus, the claims that are filed
with the application will likely be narrowed during the process of
examination, and some will be eliminated completely,111 in view of
the examiner’s location of the relevant prior art and other rejections.
The meaning and significance of portions of the claims and
specification accordingly become clearer as the examiner and
applicant “negotiate,” on public (though difficult-to-access) record,
over the scope the application can claim based on the filed
disclosure and the prior art.112
Upon issuance, the finalized claim language is set for that initial
application. (Or, if the applicant entirely abandons this application
and files no continuations, the enforceability of the claims, and
perhaps the quality of the disclosure, gain more certainty.) For an
issued patent, any continuations the applicant files might further
clarify which aspects of the specification the applicant intended to
claim, or ones the applicant thinks are most important or best
supported by the specification. And, finally, litigation sets the final

109. See supra note 23.
110. Osenga, supra note 37, at 623.
111. See infra notes 234–236 for empirical evidence that examination in fact often
accomplishes these tasks.
112. The record of this negotiation is made public when the application publishes and
can be found on https://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair.
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scope of the claims for a specific enforcement action against a
particular party.113

FIGURE 1
In sum, over time, more information is injected into the
application’s ecosystem. The legal scope of the application’s claims
becomes clearer. It also becomes clearer which parts of the written
disclosure demonstrate possession of an invention, at least if the
applicant attempts to use those portions of the disclosure to
support a proposed set of claims.
But the luxury of time comes at a cost. Examiners cite
applications without finding out whether more information is
available about the state of that application—whether it has been
abandoned, whether parts of the disclosure were deemed not to
support a proposed set of claims, etc. Examiners may not have time
for that kind of “deep dive” or that information may not be
available in the limited amount of time they have to cite that
application as prior art during examination. As far as examiners are
concerned, the inchoate state of an application is frozen in time as
prior art by publication.
Third parties performing freedom-to-operate searches may
have more time to “wait to see” what happens to an application as
it progresses through the stages shown in Figure 1. But the process
113. Note that this figure is a bit of an oversimplification because different litigations
can sometimes result in different scope for the same claims because of differences in the
parties and the evidence presented. Post-grant administrative review proceedings at the PTO
can also be used to invalidate claims, shrinking the enforceability of certain claims and
clarifying the sufficiency of parts of the disclosure.

1584

1585

Unexamined Patent Applications

of “waiting to see” is still extremely costly. Lawyers may be hired
to perform this analysis and tracking. And the company may cease
investing in that area of research until more certainty is gleaned.
Below I consider in more detail the consequence of
publishing unexamined patent applications in (1) examiner
validity determinations and (2) market participant freedom-tooperate searches.
B. Patent Applications as Prior Art in Examination Searches
1. How Examination Errors Occur
During examination, the examiner evaluates a new
application’s proposed claims by searching the prior art patent
disclosure space114—including all published patents and patent
applications published before the filing date of the new
application—to determine whether the application being examined
is novel and non-obvious.
Figure 2A shows this process in graphic form. The examiner’s
search results in a prior art patent disclosure sub-space can have an
N number of inventions (whether or not claimed) from published
patents or patent applications. Examiners consider all parts of a
prior art application—claims, figures, and specification—and thus
look at the “disclosure scope” (represented by radius R) of each
invention as supported by the entire prior art disclosure.115 The
white space represents everything that is not covered by the
prior art.

114. See supra note 32; see also John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s Patenting What?
An Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2102 (2000) (“The
overwhelming majority of the art cited by the patentee and the examiner consists of other
patents, even in industries where many inventions are not recorded in that form.”);
Christopher A. Cotropia, Mark Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Do Applicant Patent Citations
Matter?, 42 RSCH. POL’Y 844, 846 (2013) (providing empirical evidence that examiners
primarily rely on U.S. patent documents as prior art).
115. In re Heck, 699 F.2d 1331, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“The use of patents as references
is not limited to what the patentees describe as their own inventions or to the problems with
which they are concerned. They are part of the literature of the art, relevant for all they
contain.” (quoting In re Lemelson, 397 F.2d 1006, 1009 (C.C.P.A. 1968))).
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FIGURE 2
The scope of the primary claim of a new application is labeled
“app” in the figure. It appears from the figure that the prior art
already occupies the area that the “app” is trying to fill. For
example, an “app” by inventor Frankson may claim “a medical
device [with] . . . a roughened surface that inhibits the adhesion of
microorganisms.”116 The examiner can reject this “app” for lacking
novelty117 based on a prior art published application from inventor
Hatton—published four years before the filing date of the Frankson
application. The Hatton application discusses “substrates having
raised structures to inhibit adhesion of microorganisms” where
“the raised structures are prepared as a coating on a . . . . medical
device.”118 It thus provides some evidence that people already
knew how to make the Frankson invention.
Yet, the idea subspace as seen by the examiner in Figure 2A may
not be accurate. One major source of inaccuracy is the fact that the
examiner considers published patent applications as prior art,
without considering whether or not those applications have been
abandoned. In fact, there is some evidence that examiners like to
cite to abandoned applications more than to issued patents.119
Abandoned applications are of most dubious quality as prior art
because the PTO has never determined that the application’s

116. U.S. Patent Application Publ’n No. 2017/0036106 claim 1 (published Dec. 21, 2017).
117. Non-Final Office Action, Application No. 15/623,003 (Mar. 1, 2019) (pulled from
Public Pair, see supra note 112).
118. U.S. Patent Application Publ’n No. 2013/0059113 ¶ [0016] (published Mar. 7, 2013).
119. Although this study also includes applications that were abandoned as
continuations, not just new applications that were abandoned. See Christopher A. Cotropia
& David L. Schwartz, The Hidden Value of Abandoned Applications to the Patent System, 61 B.C.
L. REV. 2809, 2812 (2020).
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written disclosure can support any claim scope whatsoever. No
legally enforceable claim has, by definition, ever issued from an
abandoned application. The written disclosure of an abandoned
application may not be sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant
of this abandoned application possessed any invention at the time
of filing. Thus, as shown in Figure 2B, the accurate scope of an
abandoned application may be non-existent, and the examiner can
inaccurately reject a new “app” because of an abandoned
application that did not actually possess the invention it described.
In fact, in the example provided above, the Hatton application,
which was used as prior art to invalidate the Frankson application,
was an abandoned application. The Hatton prior art provided little
to no detail about how one would use a roughened surface to coat
an actual medical device, whether this was possible using the
proposed methods, or whether it could be accomplished using safe
materials.120 Perhaps the Frankson “app” actually accomplished
these feats and was rightfully claiming a medical device that could
prevent bacterial adhesion. Instead, the Frankson application was
rejected because of the Hatton prior art and was subsequently
abandoned. Thus, if Frankson were a legitimate applicant entitled
to a patent, the examiner’s lack of scrutiny of (or lack of information
about) the Hatton application may have prevented Frankson from
being rewarded for her invention or being incentivized to make a
commercial version of it. 121
This type of examiner error—using an abandoned patent
application to erroneously reject a new application—is only
possible because we publish patent applications. Before 2000, the
Hatton application would have never been published and could not
have been used by the examiner as prior art. Only issued patents,

120. U.S. Patent Application Publ’n No. 2013/0059113 (published Mar. 7, 2013)
(showing all examples only in laboratory conditions, which may not be suitable for in vivo use).
121. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 8, at 1591. By allowing inventors to recoup costs of
their research or providing them an opportunity to get funding for developing the invention
into a commercial product, patents financially incentivize the pursuit of new avenues of
research and development. See, e.g., id. at 1617 (“Strong patent rights are necessary to
encourage drug companies to expend large sums of money on research years before the
product can be released to the market.”); id. at 1678 n.390 (discussing use of patents to acquire
venture capital financing).
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which have undergone some scrutiny by the PTO, would have been
available in the prior art patent disclosure space.122
This might be an extreme case, however. Perhaps some parts
of an application are sufficiently described as to show possession of
an invention, and others are not. Thus, the scope of certain patent
applications is simply narrower than it appears on its face. This can
still result in an improper rejection of a new application, however,
as shown in Figure 3.

FIGURE 3
As an example, consider a published prior art application, filed
by Trepagnier, that initially claimed “[a] non-invasive method of
assessing a change in . . . tissue [including] exposing the tissue to
radiation . . . [and] detecting fluorescence emitted” to diagnose
“cancer, age, [or] diabetes.”123 The application also included a
cursory description in the written disclosure to support this
claim.124 This claim did not appear in the patent that issued two
years after the application was published.125 It is likely this claim
lacked sufficient disclosure to support such broad language.

122. As well as other non-patent literature, which is cited less often by examiners. See
supra notes 32, 114 for further detail about the difference between examiner use of published
applications and all other sources of prior art.
123. U.S. Patent Application Publ’n No. 2002/0016534 claims 78, 81 (published Feb. 7, 2002).
124. Id. at ¶ [0116].
125. U.S. Patent No. 6,721,582 (Apr. 13, 2004).

1588

1589

Unexamined Patent Applications

Nevertheless, an examiner cited126 this cursory description of
detecting diseases to reject a new application, filed by Stamatas,
claiming “[a] method of assessing the overall health of an
individual [by] . . . exposing an area of skin of each healthy
individual to a first exposure radiation to induce said area of skin
to emit a . . . fluorescent emission.”127 Again, a prior art document’s
disclosure (that of Trepagnier) that did not actually “possess” the
inventive scope was used to reject an application (by Stamatas) that
may have had a legitimate claim to occupy that space. And again,
a researcher looking to possibly make good use of unexplored
territory may have been thwarted.
This second type of error—rejecting an application based on
unsupported parts of a prior art application that may later issue as
a patent—is not unique to the use of published applications as prior
art. Prior art based on granted patents can also contain
unsupported passages. That is because the same disclosure that
publishes in an application will again be published in a granted
patent, even if parts of the disclosure were noted by the examiner
to not provide sufficient support for a proposed claim. The
Trepagnier patent discussed above still contained the cursory
disclosure from the application that was used to support claims that
had been dropped before issuance. Thus, a granted patent can also
cause the same havoc during examination when used as prior art.
Yet the existence of published applications exacerbates this
underappreciated problem of over-disclosure in granted patents by
adding even more disclosures of uncertain quality into the prior
art,128 and by making them available for citation by examiners even
before an application issues as a patent.
2. Why the Examination Errors Occur
As discussed in section I.B, granted patents already make for
bad prior art. Even issued claims can be poorly defined and
overbroad in view of the specification. And the specification is not
examined for quality except as it is used to support the claims.
People rush to the patent office to file speculative disclosures

126. Non-Final Office Action, Application No. 10/986,941 (Aug. 27, 2009) (pulled from
Public Pair, see supra note 112).
127. U.S. Patent Application Publ’n No. 2005/0203355 claim 21 (filed Nov. 15, 2004).
128. See supra note 71.

1589

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:5 (2022)

because of the potential for a high upside and the weak
enforcement of scope-limiting doctrines. These filed disclosures are
published in patents (along with the issued claims) without any
changes and can be used by examiners as prior art.
These sources of uncertainty for granted patents create even
more problems when the publication of unexamined patents is
added to the mix. The switch to a first-to-file system means people
will feel pressure to file less developed applications in larger
numbers and abandon a greater number of them as they determine
post-factum which ones are more promising.129 And publication
now allows such applications, even ones that may never grant as
patents, to occupy patent prior art idea space. The problem builds
on itself every year as more dubious applications flood in.130
The sweeping nature of examination comes into tension with
the quality of notice derived from patent published applications.
Patent examination searches are meant to be comprehensive in
finding invalidating prior art because the exclusive power granted
by patents is a high cost to the public.131 Examiners are obligated to
look broadly for prior art by interpreting the scope of the proposed
claims in a newly submitted application (i.e., the one being
examined) as extensively as reasonably possible based on its plain
meaning—under the “broadest reasonable interpretation” (“BRI”)
standard—to pull in a lot of prior art references in the search.132 The
BRI standard is meant to “result in the examiner rejecting vague
claims and the applicant clarifying the rejected claims in an

129. Cotropia, supra note 10, at 104 (“The early-filing doctrine not only adds additional
original applications on the front end—where applications are filed to play it safe—but the
doctrine also causes more applications to be filed during the prosecution of the original application
to make up for the lack of information on the front-end.”); Letter from Ron Katznelson, President
of Bi-Level Technologies, to John J. Doll, Acting Director of the U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off.: Comment
Letter on Notice of Roundtable on Deferred Examination for Patent Applications 3 (June 5, 2009),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/comments/deferredco
mments/rkatznelson.pdf (showing empirical evidence from the European Patent Office
(“EPO”) that applications filed under a first-to-file regime result in higher abandonment
rates than applications that have had time to “mature”).
130. U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963–2020, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off.,
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last visited Feb. 4,
2022) (showing a three-fold increase of filed utility applications since 2000).
131. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 1, at 418 (“Broad protection . . . implies
broad anticipation.”).
132. MPEP, supra note 28, § 2111.01.I; Risch, supra note 105, at 183.
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amendment,”133 and to allow examiners to “invalidate
[applications] using prior art that is not necessarily the same
invention as that described in the [application].”134
In addition, examiners do not generally need to concern
themselves with whether a prior art reference provides sufficient
detail to demonstrate possession of a disclosed invention (i.e., that
the reference is “enabled”). Although there is a requirement that
prior art is enabled,135 the standard for prior art enablement is even
lower than the already low standard for new applications.136
Moreover, prior art disclosure is presumed to be enabled unless the
applicant can present evidence of a lack of enablement.137 This may
often be a high burden, possibly requiring experimental evidence.138
Examiners also do not consider any of the details surrounding
the application—whether it has been abandoned or whether part of
its written description has been found wanting during
examination. Those details may also be unavailable at the time the
examiner cites the application as prior art.139 Other information
133. Risch, supra note 105, at 193.
134. Id. at 214.
135. “Long ago our predecessor court recognized that a non-enabled disclosure cannot
be anticipatory (because it is not truly prior art) if that disclosure fails to ‘enable one of skill
in the art to reduce the disclosed invention to practice.’” Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion
Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting In re Borst, 345 F.2d 851, 855
(C.C.P.A. 1962)); see also MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 1, at 415.
136. See e.g., in re Lukach, 442 F.2d 967, 970 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (“[T]he description of a
single embodiment of broadly claimed subject matter constitutes a description of the
invention for anticipation purposes, whereas the same information in a specification might
not alone be enough to provide a description of that invention for purposes of adequate
disclosure.”); Matt Lincicum, A Knot in the Eternal Golden Braid: Searching for Coherence in the
Relationship Between Enablement, Anticipation, and Obviousness, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 589, 595
(2010) (“[P]atentability enablement requires disclosure of how to make and use the
invention, whereas anticipatory enablement requires only disclosure of how to make the
invention.” (citing In re Hafner, 410 F.2d 1403, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1969)); id. at 598 (“[A]ny single
reference need not be enabling to qualify as prior art for § 103 [obviousness] purposes.”).
137. Amgen, 314 F.3d at 1355 (“[W]e hold a presumption [of prior art enablement] arises
that both the claimed and unclaimed disclosures in a prior art patent are enabled.”); id. (“In
patent prosecution the examiner is entitled to reject application claims as anticipated by a
prior art patent without conducting an inquiry into whether or not that patent is enabled or
whether or not it is the claimed material (as opposed to the unclaimed disclosures) in that
patent that are at issue.”).
138. Seymore, supra note 10, at 943–44.
139. “A patent publication is typically cited because the underlying application is still
pending at the USPTO.” Jeffrey Kuhn & Kenneth Younge, Corrected Measures for Patent
Citation Analysis: Accounting for Published Patent Applications (July 28, 2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3428375.
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may not be easy for examiners to access, such as the fact that the
work disclosed by the application has later been publicly retracted
or shown to be fraudulent.140 Examiners are so strapped for time
that this level of scrutiny would be too much for them in any case.141
This is likely the reason examiners look primarily to patent
applications and granted patents as prior art—the standard format
and singular location reduce searching costs.142 Accordingly, any
speculation and vague rambling in a patent application, even one
that is later abandoned, can become prior art, limiting later efforts
by legitimate patent applicants.
The publication of all filed patent applications has also created
a perverse incentive to disclose incorrect or vague information in
patent applications in the first place—to add “chaff” to already long
applications.143 Because unclaimed subject matter is not reviewed
for enablement, as Sean Seymore explains, “disclosing unclaimed
subject matter is an excellent ‘defensive disclosure’ strategy to
thwart subsequent patent applicants.”144 With this “spoiler tactic,”
“you disclose your technology without pursuing patent protection
for yourself just to be sure that no one else can have a patent for it
either.”145 Other scholars have also noted that patent applications
may be packed with detail to obscure the optimal manner of
achieving or practicing the invention146 or are used to mislead rivals

140. Freilich, supra note 10, at 12–13 (“An examiner cited the Theranos patent as prior
art . . . long after Theranos’ inability to make their technology functional had been
well-publicized.”).
141. See supra note 102
142. Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification, 23 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1009, 1020 (2008) (“Because of statutory and regulatory requirements, as well as common
practice among the community of patent attorneys and agents, the format of a patent is
relatively uniform.”); John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A
Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 318 (2001) (“In comparison to much of
[non-patent art], patents are readily accessible, conveniently classified and printed in a
common format.”).
143. Seymore, supra note 10, at 926.
144. Id. at 945.
145. Id. at 946 (quoting Anthony Murphy, Intellectual Property, in INNOVATION:
HARNESSING CREATIVITY FOR BUSINESS GROWTH 92 (Adam Jolly ed., 2003)).
146. See, e.g., Ajinomoto Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 597 F.3d 1267, 1272–77 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (inventors failed to disclose the preferred host strains of bacteria they used to practice
the claimed method).
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into pursuing unpromising directions of research.147 And now,
people are using artificial intelligence (“AI”) to create even more
chaos. A French startup company has already proposed using
computer-generated word permutations (“cloems”) to serve as
defensive prior art “to prevent competitors from claiming rights to
the whitespace surrounding the original patent.”148
These poor disclosures may have been a problem before, as the
PTO always published the entire disclosure filed by the applicant
in a granted patent. But now, even applications that fail to pass
through the examination process are gumming up the works of
innovators attempting to get a legitimate patent allowed at the
PTO. And this is different from the defensive publication
approaches previously used.149 These are not just blog posts or
random journal publications. Applicants, with the cost of a filing
fee, can now enter a more respected plane of prior art space
(possibly without any intention of pursuing patent rights).
Published patent applications are more likely to be cited by
examiners as prior art than non-patent literature.150 Publication of
all applications has elevated the status of this “chaff.”
C. Patent Applications in Freedom-to-Operate Searches
1. How Search Errors Occur
A company or individual interested in developing a product or
service will at some point want to know whether this new research
direction would legally infringe others’ patent rights.151 They
would thus conduct a “freedom-to-operate” (“FTO”) search to
147. Janet Freilich, Patent Clutter, 103 IOWA L. REV. 925, 962 (2018) (“[C]ompanies
commonly patent numerous inventions or mechanisms in order to hide the ‘one good one in
a flood of bad inventions.’” (quoting Corinne Langinier, Using Patents to Mislead Rivals, 38
CAN. J. ECON. 520, 522 (2005))).
148. Dennis Crouch, Would You Like 10,000 Cloems with That Patent?, PATENTLY-O (Oct.
1, 2014), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/10/would-cloems-patent.html.
149. See, e.g., Douglas Lichtman, Scott Baker & Kate Kraus, Strategic Disclosure in the
Patent System, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2175, 2175–76, 2180 (2000) (discussing a competitor’s strategic
incentive to create prior art in disclosures such as “published journal articles, unpublished
but publicly available doctoral dissertations, public demonstrations, and even certain offers
of sale.”).
150. See supra note 114.
151. Dan Ciuriak, Generalized Freedom to Operate (N.Y.U L. Inst. Int’l L. & Just. MegaReg
Forum Paper No. 2016/3, 2016), https://www.iilj.org/publications/generalizedfreedom-operate/.
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determine whether there are patents, issued or in the pipeline,
which would block their new activity. Because patent applications
are published and have the potential to become issued patents, they
are often considered as part of any meaningful freedom-tooperate search.152 The difficulty in predicting the final claims that
may originate from a published patent application injects
significant uncertainty into FTO searching and any subsequent
decisions to invest in a research area.

152. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: THE OPERATION OF IP MARKETS
104, 200–03, 234–36 (Mar. 18, 2009) [hereinafter FTC MARCH 18 TRANSCRIPT] (transcript available
at
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2009/03/evolving-ip-marketplace)
(patent counsel at leading firms discuss importance of applications in FTO searching as well as
acquisition of new companies); Jamie Sheridan, New Product Clearance: Freedom to Operate
Search and Analysis, 23 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 14, 15 (2011) (recommending an FTO search
include “third-party U[.]S[.] patents and patent applications”); Tamsen Valoir, IP Due
Diligence: Top Ten Tasks, 9 M & A LAW. 18 (2005) (same); IP and Business: Launching a New
MAGAZINE
(Sept.
2005),
Product:
Freedom
to
Operate,
WIPO
https://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2005/05/article_0006.html.
I do not address the scenario in which industries are completely overwhelmed
with the amount of information in the pending patent idea space and do not consider patents
or applications when deciding to pursue a technology. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE
EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: THE OPERATION OF IP MARKETS 18 (May 5, 2009) [hereinafter
FTC MAY 5 TRANSCRIPT] (transcript available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/eventscalendar/2009/05/evolving-ip-marketplace) (Daralyn Durie, Partner at Durie, Tangri, Page,
Lemley, Roberts & Kent: “In my experience on the IT side, it is virtually impossible to
conduct a meaningful patent clearance, if you’re talking about a product [that] has a number
of different components and that is complex.”); Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 19, 21 (2008) (“[B]oth researchers and companies in component industries simply
ignore patents. Virtually everyone does it.”); Menell & Meurer, supra note 11, at 33 (“The
imprecision of patent claim scope in the software and business method fields is so bad that
many developers ignore patents at the front-end and deal with [it in] licensing and
litigation.”); id. at 48 (“The notice problem is so severe that competitors in many high tech
fields do not even bother trying to learn about potential encumbrances.”). The lack of
searching is bad for innovation because those companies may be reinventing the wheel
(instead of licensing it) or may be setting themselves up for needless litigation. Published
applications produce no unique harm here, however, since the entire space is being
ignored—patents and applications alike.
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Figure 4A shows a pending patent idea sub-space, which may
result from an FTO search of all enforceable patents and pending
patent applications relevant to the product or service the innovator
is interested in developing. The search returns “N” inventions from
patents and applications, with a claim scope “R.” The claims of the
application are the best predictor of future issued claims and are
thus the logical initial focus of an FTO search.153 The white space
represents everything that is available for the public to make and
use freely (whether because it is already in the public domain or
has yet to be invented).

FIGURE 4
Because this search includes new published patent
applications,154 it may be a highly inaccurate prediction of what will
actually become a legally enforceable right, as shown in Figure 4B.
Because of the ability of applicants to file continuation applications
or add new claims during examination, even when an FTO search
153. See, e.g., Freedom to Operate: Everything You Need to Know, UPCOUNSEL,
https://www.upcounsel.com/freedom-to-operate (last visited Feb. 5, 2022) (“The purpose
of searching for freedom to operate is to find any published patent applications or approved
patents that include claims covering the product, process, or technology you plan to target.”
(emphasis added)); Linda J. Thayer, When Is a “Freedom to Operate” Opinion Cost-Effective?,
FINNEGAN: TODAY’S GENERAL COUNSEL (Feb./Mar. 2013), https://www.finnegan.com
/en/insights/articles/when-is-a-freedom-to-operate-opinion-cost-effective.html (“[A] clearance
search is performed for unexpired patents and published applications that may claim the various
components [of a new product].” (emphasis added)).
154. Supra note 109.
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accurately locates a relevant application, claims on entirely new
inventions, as shown by (1) in Figure 4B, may later emerge from that
application that were difficult to predict at the time of the search.155
Alternatively, given the difficulty of searching through the large
number of published applications, it is possible that some of these
“new” inventions (1), are ones that existed at the time of the FTO
search but the search did not accurately identify them as
being relevant.156
Claims may also be narrowed, as shown by (2) in Figure 4B,
during prosecution, or may only be enforceable with narrower
scope. And the applicant may even abandon some of the claims,
leaving that area available for use, as shown by (3). In sum, the
available whitespace as it appeared during the FTO search (Figure
4A) may not accurately reflect the legal rights that will eventually
be protectable (Figure 4B).
For example, an initial claim in an application may be to “[a]n
article comprising a superoleophobic surface.”157 Superoleophobic
surfaces repel oil and allow it to easily roll off the surface.158 Figure
5A shows the scope of this initial “application claim” in graphic
form. By reading only the claim, you may suppose that the
inventors possess the entire idea space of these types of surfaces,
excluding all others from practicing this invention without a
license. Yet the examiner in this example found a prior art
application that also disclosed superoleophobic surfaces and
rejected the initial application’s claim.159 In the end, what issued
from this application was a much narrower claim, based on the
specific surface structure disclosed in the specification. The granted
invention only allowed the inventors to possess, and exclude others
from making, using, or selling, a superoleophobic surface with a
155. FTC MAY 5 TRANSCRIPT, supra note 152, at 114 (Michelle Lee, Patent Counsel at
Google: “[W]e are routinely surprised with what we read in the written description and what
the patent owner claims the coverage is.”).
156. FTC REPORT, supra note 8, at 91 (“Panelists explained that ‘it is impossible to
achieve any degree of certainty by clearance searches with today’s [search] systems.’ Vague
or stretched claims might ‘never [be] found doing any type of searching.’” (second alteration
in original)).
157. U.S. Patent Application Publ’n No. 2010/0316842 claim 1 (published Dec. 16, 2010).
158. Boxun Leng, Zhengzhong Shao, Gijsbertus de With & Weihua Ming,
Superoleophobic Cotton Textiles, 25 LANGMUIR 2456, 2456 (2009) (“Only those surfaces
with . . . low roll-off angles for oil droplets can be regarded as truly superoleophobic surfaces.”).
159. Final Office Action, App No. 12/599,465 (Feb. 14, 2017) (pulled from Public Pair,
see supra note 112).
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“fluorinated” surface chemistry and a specific structure of
“portru[sions]” “includ[ing] flat caps.”160 Figure 5B shows the scope
of this “granted” (and narrower) claim in graphic form.
A potential inventor may be dissuaded or significantly delayed,
based on the high levels of uncertainty stemming from an initial
application claim, from spending resources on something he
believes will shortly be blocked by a patent.161 In the example
above, perhaps there may be delays in the development of other
types of superoleophobic surfaces, labeled as “new product” in
Figure 5A–B. Or the inventor may instead divert funding from
research to pay attorneys to analyze or track competitors’ patent
applications,162 to the extent such searching is feasible in view of the
volume of patenting activity and ability to predictably determine
claim scope in that field.163 An attorney may be hired after an initial
FTO search to review the entirety of certain applications to
determine the scope of the claims that may originate from them. In
our example above, an attorney may advise that the application
claiming all superoleophobic surfaces only provided one example
of a superoleophobic surface, which is likely all the applicant will
be able to claim in a granted patent.

160. U.S. Patent No. 10,202,711 (issued Feb. 12, 2019) (claim 1).
161. FTC MARCH 18 TRANSCRIPT, supra note 152, at 200 (Carl Horton, Chief IP Counsel
of General Electric, discussing the strategy of “watch[ing]” an application before deciding
whether to proceed with the product design or to license the invention).
162. Id. at 201–02 (counsel of various firms discussing the resources required to track
applications as they proceed through the PTO).
163. See Reilly, supra note 13, at 1121.
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FIGURE 5
Sometimes, the application’s final claim scope is even less
predictable than in the provided example, and attorneys have to
wait until more information is available before they can predict the
outcome of an application.164 As examination proceeds, more
information about the prior art and the reasonable claim scope that
can be supported by the specification emerges.165 But the delays to
gain this information can be considerable. On average, nineteen
percent of applications, are still pending nine months after
publication without any substantive examiner input.166 And the
examiner’s input can only be located in a highly inaccessible
format—a slow government website with non-searchable PDFs of
the examination history.167 More than twenty-two months pass on
average until the PTO officially publishes a final, indexed, searchable
version of any patent that issues from that application filing.168

164. See supra note 161.
165. See supra Section II.A.
166. PTO Dashboard, supra note 29 (showing first action pendency to be an average of
15.4 months); John F. Martin, The Myth of the 18-Month Delay in Publishing Patent Applications,
IP WATCHDOG (Aug. 3, 2015), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/08/03/the-myth-ofthe-18-month-delay-in-publishing-patent-applications/id=60185/ (nineteen percent of
applications publish at six months after filing).
167. See supra note 112.
168. PTO Dashboard, supra note 29 (showing total pendency to be an average of 22.9 months).
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This may be an eternity for competitors to operate with so little
information about an application.169
2. Why Search Errors Occur
For market participants that perform FTO searches, pending
applications are seen as “maintaining a ‘cloud’ over a field of
activity and continuing uncertainty about the scope of potential
claim coverage.”170 Part of the uncertainty existed before the PTO
published applications. Claim boundaries of granted patents were
always unclear, and courts unpredictably applied legal doctrines
governing the sufficiency of disclosure in supporting claim
scope.171 But now that all applications are published, participants
are forced to grapple with higher levels of uncertainty as they sift
through overbroad claims and sweeping, overlong disclosures of
published applications, many of which will be abandoned or
significantly limited in legal scope.
As explained in section II.A, the initial claims in an application
are overbroad because (1) the goal of patent applicants is to get the
broadest claim one can get away with,172 (2) applicants are often not
aware of the relevant prior art,173 and (3) because there is little
downside to overbroad claiming because of the infinite
opportunities to amend claims. Filed claims are thus likely to be of
indefinite scope and to be purely functional. Because the applicant
can simply amend a claim to render it less vague or to add
structure, there is every incentive to file a vague and functional
169. Especially in industries with short product cycles, such as high tech. See FTC
REPORT, supra note 8, at 91.
170. Letter from Jimmy Jackson, Vice President of Pub. Pol’y & Commc’ns of Biocom,
to the Off. of the Deputy Comm’r for Pat. Examination Pol’y, at 3 (May 29, 2009) (available
at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/comments/
deferredcomments/biocom.pdf); see also Letter from Tom DiLenge, Gen. Couns.,
Biotechnology Indus. Org., to the Hon. John J. Doll, Acting Dir. of the U.S. Pat. & Trademark
Off., at 6 (May 29, 2009) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/web/
offices/pac/dapp/opla/comments/deferredcomments/bio.pdf) (discussing that pending
patent applications can create “uncertainty about freedom-to-operate for manufacturing or
development businesses.”).
171. See Rantanen, supra note 11, at 924–25.
172. R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration and the Failure of
Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 215 (2002) (“[T]he patentee has both the motive and the
opportunity to behave strategically” in the hopes that “the PTO will ‘miss something’ and
allow the unwarranted scope.”).
173. Again, this may be a strategic decision. See Wagner, supra note 172, at 215 n.193.
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claim—which are often broader than the scope of the application in
fact allows—and see whether the examiner even bothers rejecting
it. For example, the claim of a superoleophobic surface discussed
earlier is purely functional because it describes the desired
properties of a material. Examination forced the applicant to add
structural details to reduce the scope of this overbroad claim. The
rush to the patent office because of our switch to a first-to-file
system also makes overbroad claiming even more likely as the
initial invention is even less developed, and the applicant is even
less informed about the prior art.
Even if a third party decides to invest effort into looking at the
written disclosure of an application, and not just the claims (i.e., the
entire “application scope”), it is still difficult to predict which
claims will originate from it. The way Rambus was able to attack a
competitor, by amending its pending claims to match a new
technology standard, is just one example of this unpredictability.174
Clearly, it is not as trivial, as some scholars argue, to “derive the
broadest claim scope supportable by any application[]” “by
reading a patent application’s original disclosure[.]”175
One reason is the difficulty in predicting how much disclosure
will be deemed sufficient during examination to support various
claims. That is because the requirement that the specification
support the claims is not a literal one.176 It is a standard, not a rule.
Claims encompass a broader idea,177 while the specification only
provides examples that show the applicant really knew or
“possessed” the invention at the time of filing178 and could teach

174. See supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text.
175. F. Scott Kieff, Case for Preferring Patent-Validity Litigation over Second-Window
Review and Gold-Plated Patents: When One Size Doesn’t Fit All, How Could Two Do the Trick, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 1937, 1960 (2009).
176. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (explaining
that there is no requirement that “the specification recite the claimed invention in
haec verba[.]”).
177. Compare Chiang, supra note 49, at 1102 (“The specification describes the invention
created by the patentee so that others can make and use it.”), with id. at 1103 (“In contrast, a
claim describes only the key inventive features of the invention—those that form the essence
of the patentee’s idea.”).
178. Ariad Pharm., 589 F.3d at 1351 (“[T]he specification must describe an invention
understandable to that skilled artisan and show that the inventor actually invented the
invention claimed.”).
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others how to use and make it.179 Accordingly, claims of various
levels of abstraction and of different combinations of disclosed
elements can arise from the same specification.180
Applicants can also provide mere speculation to support their
claims. Such speculation means that a market participant
performing an FTO search may erroneously conclude that a certain
intellectual subspace is occupied—due to speculative guessing in
the patent application—and choose not to pursue that area of
inquiry. The public is thus deprived of any actual, experimental
information that may be gained from such pursuit, and is left only
with the speculation in the original application.181
Predicting which claims will originate from an application is
also difficult because written disclosures are written to be long and
sweeping, often encompassing many inventions, to provide
support for any future amendments.182 The applicant may amend,
remove, or add claims an infinite number of times during
examination. This makes the patent application an ever-shifting
legal document, with claims of varying scope appearing and
disappearing, leaving market participants uncertain of their
findings despite a thorough FTO search.
On top of the analytic difficulty of anticipating the scope of any
claims that may be supported by a specification, market
participants can never be sure of how an examiner will view that
application. Examiners have limited resources when determining
proper claim scope and enforcing the sufficiency of the
disclosure.183 Many applications can simply slip through the cracks.
This examination weakness also creates a feedback loop in
incentivizing poor quality filings. Since few patents are ever

179. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (“The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise,
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to make and
use the same . . . .”).
180. Chiang, supra note 49, at 1105 (“[T]he specification embodiment embodies the
claimed idea, but the claimed idea may be reflected in countless other embodiments;
conversely, the specification embodiment also embodies countless other ideas in addition to
what is claimed.”).
181. See Lemley, supra note 79, at 1182.
182. Or continuation applications. But continuations may be less problematic than new
applications because there is information available about earlier versions of the application:
the examination history, which claims already issued from the application, etc.
183. See supra notes 139–141 and accompanying text.
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litigated,184 and many industries do not acquire patent rights with
the intent to enforce them,185 applicants may be encouraged by this
low level of scrutiny from examiners to draft vague and speculative
applications. Slapdash examination thus results in low-quality
disclosures and high uncertainty for third parties attempting to
make predictions.
These effects are exacerbated by the growing number of patent
applications filed at the PTO every year, given that the PTO will
publish almost all of them.186 Moreover, because of our switch to
the first-to-file regime, it is likely that many of these applications
are of lower quality and less likely to issue as valid patents.187 With
every new published application, the cost and difficulty of
performing an FTO search increase.188
III. STEPS TOWARDS REFORM
As discussed above, the decision to publish unexamined patent
applications has created a perfect storm with the transition to a
first-to-file system and the ever-increasing number of filed
applications. We allow published applications, even ones that are
never granted, to create a temporary cloud of uncertainty in the
pending patent idea space or to permanently occupy the prior art
idea space. Both effects chill innovation and deter the development
and funding of new research areas. Consequently, there is an
unrecognized tradeoff in the decision to publish all applications—
a tradeoff between the timeliness and transparency of notice
provided by patent applications (i.e., benefits) versus the quality of
such notice (i.e., costs).
A. Qualifying the Public Benefits of Early Disclosure
Generally, publishing patent disclosures is important for the
patent system. As Jason Rantanen puts it, “[i]nformation is the

184. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1501
(2001) (“[I]t is reasonable to estimate that at most only about two percent of all patents are ever
litigated, and less than two-tenths of one percent of all issued patents actually go to court.”).
185. See infra note 222.
186. See supra note 1.
187. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
188. Bock, supra note 90, at 289; BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 11, at 10 (“Clearance costs
are affected by the number of prospective rights that must be checked for possible infringement.”).
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lifeblood of innovation.”189 Some scholars argue that our patent
system requires disclosure as a quid pro quo for the exclusivity
granted to the patentee (disclosure theory).190 They also point out
that publishing patent disclosures is important for the diffusion of
scientific knowledge,191 and that it allows others to avoid wasting
effort on what has already been done,192 instead building on what
has been published.193 Others argue that patents promote other
“peripheral disclosures,” which also benefit society.194 For example,
it allows firms that have obtained a patent to market their goods by
touting the details of how their product or process works, and even
distributing free samples, without fear of being copied.195 Litigants
are also able to more openly discuss details of an invention during
patent infringement suits in court.196
More fundamentally (and perhaps less controversially197),
however, the disclosure is necessary because it is the only way to
189. Jason Rantanen, Peripheral Disclosure, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 4 (2012).
190. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (“[T]he patent system represents a
carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the public disclosure of new
and useful advances in technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period
of time.”); Rantanen, supra note 189, at 5 (“That information is part of the quid-pro-quo
exchange with inventors: in return for the exclusive right to practice their invention,
inventors must describe that invention in the patent and explain how it is made and used.”).
191. Daniel K. N. Johnson & David Popp, Forced Out of the Closet: The Impact of the
American Inventors Protection Act on the Timing of Patent Disclosure, 34 RAND J. ECON., 96, 96
(2003); Seymore, supra note 10, at 974 (warning that “[m]ost information disclosed in patents
is never published elsewhere” and that “[i]f an inventor withholds knowledge, it will likely
be lost.”); see also Fromer, supra note 8, at 554 (“Much of the information contained in—or
that ought to be in—patents is not published elsewhere.”).
192. Cotropia, supra note 10, at 85 (“The earlier patent law ends the race between
multiple researchers seeking to invent the same technology, the fewer resources are then
devoted to a duplicative effort.”).
193. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 8, at 1607–10 (discussing theory of cumulative innovation).
194. Rantanen, supra note 189, at 7 (“[P]eripheral disclosure . . . refer[s] to the disclosure
of information that would not occur in the absence of a patent system.”).
195. See id. at 27–28, 34–37.
196. Id. at 32–33.
197. There is still much debate about the validity of the quid pro quo model of
disclosure. Devlin, supra note 9, at 410 (“But is disclosure actually society’s primary benefit
from the patent bargain?”); Holbrook, supra note 1, at 132 (“[The teaching function of]
disclosure is, in fact, in considerable tension with [other] justifications for the patent
system.”). There is also no consensus about the value of patent documents as sources of
technological information. See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 8, at 560 (“Notwithstanding the
primacy of the patent document as a publicly available repository of information about a
patented invention, a good deal of evidence suggests that technologists do not find that it
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delimit the intangible idea of the invention—it “communicates to
the world exactly what the innovator has created” and demarcates
his possession of it.198 It thus serves an important notice function,
allowing others to design around,199 license,200 or invest201 in a
patented invention.
Scholarship in the field, while recognizing that the quality of
patent documents creates notice failures,202 seem to exalt the
various social benefits of universal publication of patent
applications. The touted benefits include promoting knowledge
diffusion for cumulative innovation,203 timeliness of notice to
competitors204 and examiners,205 and reduction of duplicative
research efforts.206 Scholars argue that even applications that are
contains pertinent information for their research.”); id. at 554–55 n.73 (acknowledging that
patents may not be the sole source of disclosure of technical information—”some recent
economic work demonstrates that inventors sometimes publish a scientific article and secure
a patent on the same invention”); Devlin, supra note 9, at 403 (“[T]he extent to which patent
documents successfully teach the inner workings of cutting-edge technologies is quite
limited.”); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Who Reads Patents?, 35 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 421,
422–23 (2017) (Supplementary Figure 3) (only forty percent of scientific researchers from
different technical fields found most recent patents read to be “very” or “moderately” useful
for “[i]nstructions on how to make the patented invention”).
198. Holbrook, supra note 1, at 146.
199. Fromer, supra note 8, at 539.
200. Rantanen, supra note 189, at 33–34 (patent disclosures expedite licensing negotiations).
201. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 8, at 1678 n.390 (discussing use of patents to acquire
venture capital financing).
202. See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 8, at 543 (recognizing “disclosure’s current inadequacy
in the patent system.”); Risch, supra note 105, at 180 (“Despite complex interpretive rules,
patent law has failed to accomplish one of its essential missions: allowing interested parties
to understand a patent’s scope in a consistent and predictable manner.”); BESSEN & MEURER,
supra note 11, at 10; Christina Mulligan & Timothy B. Lee, Scaling the Patent System, 68 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 289, 309 (2012); cf. Seymore, supra note 10, at 974 (“[T]he nature and quality
of the information under consideration is important.”).
203. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 1, at 73 (knowledge diffusion); Fromer, supra note 8,
at 554 (knowledge diffusion); see also Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285
F.3d 1046, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Newman, J., dissenting) (recognizing the “[i]nformation
dissemination” function of patent disclosures, arguing that these documents should be protected
from any “legal obstacles to the disclosure of scientific and technologic information.”).
204. Lemley & Moore, supra note 4, at 90–92 (reducing abusive continuation tactics).
205. Kuhn & Younge, supra note 139, at 2 (examiner citations to published applications
“may be more likely to target recent prior art because pending patent applications are
generally more recent than granted patents.”). But see Wagner, supra note 172, at 165 n.16
(discussing how “overclaiming” in patent applications increases search costs for the PTO).
206. Lück, supra note 1, at 2678 (showing a reduction in examiner’s prior art rejections
after the U.S. began publishing applications as an indication “that at least some inventors
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ultimately abandoned by the applicant, can still be used as publicly
available, easily searchable prior art during examination to
“generate an administrative disclosure that prevents the issuance
of broader patent rights to other applicants.”207 In view of these
benefits, some have contended that applications should be
published immediately upon filing,208 and that all exceptions to
publishing, such as requests for non-publication, should be
eliminated entirely.209
Thus, there is no general recognition that there are both public
benefits and costs to publishing unexamined patent applications.210
Or that the uncertainty of the scope of published applications—as
prior art or as a pending legal right—may deprive proper claimants
of patent rights or hinder efforts of third parties to determine what
constitutes “private property” in the idea space. Any proposal for
reforming notice failures caused by these patent documents must
consider both.
For administrative expediency, and because substantive
examination takes time, we have chosen to publish applications
without any examination in order to provide timely notice and
transparency. But both timing and application scope uncertainty
are continuous variables. Since unexamined applications are often
of poorer notice quality than applications that have undergone
some examination, perhaps their immediate publication is not as
valuable as one would assume. There may be a way to change our
examination system to achieve a better compromise of both timing
and quality of notice. At the extreme end, if an application does not
disclose anything patentable, it provides no useful notice
information, and perhaps should never be published (at least not
as a PTO-sanctioned document).
B. Reframing the Costs of Publishing Unexamined Applications
Another way of looking at the public cost of publishing all
applications is to realize that many of the benefits of the generated
and/or their lawyers will read or become aware of and use the disclosed applications to
avoid competition and overlap with already claimed technologies”).
207. See Cotropia & Schwartz, supra note 119, at 2842.
208. Chien, supra note 9, at 848; Ouellette, supra note 9, at 597.
209. Lemley & Moore, supra note 4, at 108–09.
210. See Freilich, supra note 43, at 154 n.14 (“[P]redictive errors in patent law will often
fall on the public.”).
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notice failures flow to the individual applicant. Having a published
patent application is a privilege. Applicants can reap tangible
benefits from the uncertainty that their applications can create.
First, the publication of an application has legal significance. It
is notice to the outside world that the applicant has secured a filing
date with the PTO, and that the application is in the administrative
pipeline for a patent. Moreover, if the application’s claims issue as
“substantially identical” patent claims, then the patentee could get
damages for infringement of the claims as of the time of publication,
if the infringer had actual notice of them.211 All of these factors
elevate the status of published applications above all non-patent
publications in the eyes of potential competitors.
Second, the zone of uncertainty created around the scope of a
patent application can benefit the applicant even without actual
notice to competitors. Everyone who performs an FTO search will
remain in the dark about the eventual scope of what the applicant
intends to claim. Thus, the applicant can dominate a large swath of
“idea” space for an extended amount of time without incurring
significant costs. The zone of uncertainty can increase even further
if one files multiple applications in the same area or describes many
inventions in a single application.
Third, no matter what ultimately happens to the application
during examination, the publication of the entire disclosure means
that the applicant gets to defensively use the zone of uncertainty
created by the application indefinitely. All the speculative and
overbroad statements in the initial published application may
knock out any later-filed applications by their competitors as prior
art. A similar result could not be achieved from simply posting
random ramblings in a blog post, for instance. It is the examiners’
heavy use of PTO applications in prior art searching that provides
this defensive advantage.
Fourth, published patent applications can be used to acquire
funding and attract potential investors. They can serve as a signal
to investors “that the company is well managed, is at a certain stage

211. 35 U.S.C. § 154(d) (requiring “actual notice” to the infringer and “substantially
identical” claims).

1606

1607

Unexamined Patent Applications

in development, and has defined and carved out a market niche.”212
Published applications can also increase opportunities for licensing.213
In sum, publishing patent applications comes with substantial,
tangible benefits to individual applicants. In a way, applicants
benefit from polluting the published patent idea space with
uncertainty. These benefits come at a cost to the public at large.
Proposals for reform can thus equitably consider shifting some of
these costs to applicants.
C. Reform Proposals
Publishing unexamined patent applications can come at
increased social costs to public notice and reaps tangible benefits to
patent applicants. This new recognition of the cost of publishing
applications brings up two considerations for reform: (1) that the
entire disclosure, not just the claims, creates uncertainty around
published applications, and (2) that the point of publication is
critical—it is the point at which third parties (including examiners)
can first rely on the information. Thus, possible reforms should
focus on (1) forcing applicants to internalize some of the “notice
pollution” costs created by their entire disclosure, and (2) providing
the PTO with tools to improve the quality of applications
before publication.
1. Cost-Shifting
One way to potentially increase the quality of the information
in patent applications, and to reduce the number of lower quality
filings, is to shift some of the public notice costs to the applicant
(i.e., force internalization of the costs). The ability to constructively
reduce an invention to practice, the ability to amend claims ad
infinitum, the lack of any requirement to perform a prior art search,
and the weak enforcement of disclosure sufficiency requirements
governing claim scope all significantly lower the costs of filing (and
thus publishing) a patent application “just to see how it goes.”

212. Lemley, supra note 184, at 1505–06.
213. Cotropia & Schwartz, supra note 119, at 2835–36. In some fields, applications are
used more often than patents to get a license. See, e.g., FTC MARCH 18 TRANSCRIPT, supra note
152, at 35 (Jon Soderstrom, Ph.D., Managing Director, Office of Cooperative Research, Yale
University: “In the area of life sciences in particular, we find that most everything that we
license is in the form of a patent application . . . .”).
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Having the PTO review long-shot applications is generally a waste
of public resources, even before one considers all the other harms
these kinds of published applications can cause to innovation.
The general theory of raising filing costs (or adding a
publication cost) is that applicants will only choose to go forward
with applications they think are worthwhile, elevating the quality
of filed applications.214 This may mitigate at least the most
egregious cases, in which an applicant is likely to abandon an
application because the quality is so low. That mitigation may help
avoid the costliest type of “pollution” to the patent idea space—an
application that creates blocking prior art and chilling effects without
having any value to the applicant or to knowledge diffusion.
A general elevation of filing fees, or simply adding another fee
to have examination continue, may be too blunt of an instrument in
many cases, however. It would disadvantage smaller businesses,
while allowing larger ones to continue filing speculative
applications with overbroad claims. Even if costs are made
progressive in terms of the size of the filer,215 this reform is
overinclusive. It would be difficult to use it precisely enough to
incentivize higher quality filings. It would indiscriminately reduce
all filings, potentially harming legitimate research investments,
particularly in technology sectors such as the life sciences that do
not tend to produce the most pollutant.216
The cost-shifting solution, however, can be tuned to better solve
the problem of the uncertain scope created by published
applications. The PTO already charges higher fees for larger claim
sets, which should decrease the potential scope of applications. The
PTO could also set a word limit on applications, with increased
costs for extra length. This would be more finely tuned to the
problems caused by lengthy applications disclosing too many,
perhaps speculative, embodiments and the uncertain way they are
214. Merges, supra note 22, at 598 (“[W]here the probability of receiving a patent is low,
the value of the invention low, and the cost of applying for the patent high, prospective
applicants will choose not to file.”).
215. See 35 U.S.C. § 41(h)(1) (“[filing, examination, and maintenance] fees charged . . .
[are] reduced by 50 percent with respect to their application to any small
business concern . . . .”).
216. See, e.g., FTC REPORT, supra note 8, at 89 (“On the other hand, panelists from the
life sciences indicated that they are ‘very capable of reading a specification [in an application]
and being able to tell what kind of claims might come out.’” (quoting panelist Shafmaster at
235, from Mar. 18, 2009 transcript).
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used to support amendments or as prior art. This may nevertheless
still be a rather blunt instrument for the problem.
Another solution is to make it more expensive to publish
applications that are the most costly in terms of notice. Thus, patent
applications that create fewer notice problems, such as those with
easily searchable structures, those using standardized
terminology,217 or those with the least number of hypothetical
(prophetic) examples (or a low working-to-prophetic-example
ratio) would be less costly to publish. Examples that use poor
experimental design—“small sample sizes, no statistical analysis,
and failure to blind the investigators or randomize the
subjects”218—can also be considered more costly, because they
indicate that the invention may not actually work and is therefore
not entitled to occupy patent idea space.
Focusing on prophetic examples and the replicability criteria
listed above would reduce some speculative or broadly worded
applications. Given some of the difficulties that examiners have in
deciding whether applications meet the disclosure sufficiency
requirements at the time of examination, this may be a quick and
dirty way to reduce their numbers.219
The proposal to increase fees for applications lacking structural
details and for those lacking standardized terminology could be
more problematic, however. It may disadvantage software patents
over chemical and biotech ones.220 There is literature showing that
patent law is potentially functioning as it should in the chemical
arts and life sciences,221 while failing in other tech sectors.222 But this
217. See Mulligan & Lee, supra note 202, at 289, 297.
218. Freilich, supra note 10, at 21, 21 n.124.
219. A few scholars have recognized that patent applications make for poor prior art
but have proposed procedural reforms that would require unrealistically high levels of
scrutiny from examiners. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 172, at 159, 210 (proposing informationforcing mechanism during examination); Freilich, supra note 10, at 32–36 (same); Seymore,
supra note 10, at 966–69 (proposing that examiners have initial burden of proof in showing
enablement of prior art).
220. See Mulligan & Lee, supra note 202, at 298.
221. See supra note 216.
222. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 11, at 15–16. For example, in industries such as
semiconductors and manufacturing, patents may not necessarily be acquired to be enforced,
but may be meant to be used defensively or as market signaling devices, reducing the need
for high-quality applications. See R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2157 (2009) (“As more patentees adopt these nontraditional
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may still be a difficult reform to enact, given lobbying forces and
the fact that it may run counter to the TRIPS agreement, which does
not allow discrimination based on “field of technology.”223
Moreover, a push for language standardization could be seen as
punishing a patentee for acting as his own lexicographer, which
may be necessary for pioneering inventions and is a wellestablished right in our patent system.224
The proposal to increase costs for publishing non-standard
terms is not completely outlandish, however. The PTO ran a Patent
Glossary Patent Pilot program from 2014 to 2016 for softwarerelated applications,225 demonstrating its willingness to single out
particular technology sectors for reform. The specific idea
adopted—use of a glossary of terms in the application—would
ameliorate some but not all of the notice issues with published
patent applications. By increasing costs for filing applications with
non-standardized terminology in the first place, it generally aligns
with the proposal above. And the glossary would help examiners
interpret terms in patent applications when those applications are
approaches, we can expect patent quality to drop.”); Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson &
John P. Walsh, Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S.
Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 17 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 7552,
2000), http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552 (finding that eighty-two percent of
respondents to a survey listed “blocking rival patents on related innovations” as a motive
for patenting); cf. Janet Freilich, Patent Shopping, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 619, 643–44 (2020)
(“Defensive aggregators acquire large numbers of patents in order to guarantee that their
clients will not be sued for infringement of those patents.”). And software and business
method patents, though frequently litigated, are considered to be of low disclosure quality
because they inherently lack the structure of mechanical or chemical patents and are
frequently invalidated in court. See Collins, supra note 98, at 1607 (“Software inventions are,
at least as a practical matter and for the purpose of patent law, a purely functional
technology.”); Merges, supra note 22, at 581 (“[B]usiness methods are not tied to particular
machinery or devices . . . .”); John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Patent
Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 695–97 (2011)
(discussing invalidation rates).
223. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—Multilateral Trade Negotiations (the
Uruguay Round): Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Rights, art. 27, ¶ 1,
Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) (hereinafter “TRIPS”); see also Stefania Fusco, Trips NonDiscrimination Principle: Are Alice and Bilski Really the End of NPEs?, 24 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
131, 158 (2016).
224. 5A DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.03[3] (2020) (“It is well settled
that “[a] patentee is his own lexicographer . . . .”).
225. USPTO Launches New Glossary Pilot Program to Promote Patent Claim Clarity, U.S.
Pat. & Trademark Off., http:// www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/uspto-launchesnew-glossary-pilot-program-promote-patentclaim-clarity (last modified Dec. 11, 2014, 5:09
PM); GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 33–34.
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being used as prior art, reducing that type of notice failure. The
glossary would not, however, necessarily make it easier to search
pending applications (for FTO purposes) in fields with nonstandardized terminology. And it would certainly not result in
shorter disclosures.
2. Not Publishing Everything
Ultimately, cost-shifting may not provide sufficient incentives
for applicants to file higher quality applications. Instead of simply
increasing costs to the applicant, reform can instead aim to provide
the applicant and the PTO with more data so they can make an
informed choice about whether an application (or a portion thereof)
is valuable enough to be published.
Reforms may involve delaying publication or, as described
below, finding ways to achieve both timely and higher quality
notice. But, in any case, the system may be better off if some
applications (or portions thereof) are never published. Twenty
percent of applicants eventually decide that their patent application
was not worth pursuing at all,226 with over ten percent abandoning
their application early in the process.227 Even granted patents
contain throw-away disclosures that would not be sufficient to
support any claim. To the extent we can identify such information
early in the examination process, why should the PTO even publish
it? Why publish speculative information, with the imprimatur of
the PTO, that creates blocking prior art and chilling effects and has
no value to the applicant or to knowledge diffusion? The following
sub-sections consider a variety of approaches that the PTO could
undertake to reduce the publication of speculative information.
a. Pre-publication examination: In general. How can we provide
timely notice of applications but still take time to improve their
quality? One way to allow for both timely and higher quality notice
226. See Cotropia & Schwartz, supra note 119, at 2846. This number includes
continuation applications that have been abandoned, id. at 2846 n.234, and thus
overestimates the number of applications that were abandoned after filing without any
subsequent filings.
227. See Letter from Ron Katznelson, President of Bi-Level Techs., to John J. Doll, Acting
Dir. of the U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Comment Letter on Notice of Roundtable on Deferred
Examination for Patent Applications at App’x p. 14 (May 29, 2009),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/comments/
deferredcomments/rkatznelson.pdf.
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is to eliminate the provisional application period—in which an
applicant uses a one-year placeholder document (that is never
examined) to secure a filing date at the PTO.228 This would allow
the PTO to immediately examine all applications. Applications
would still publish “on time”—within eighteen months of the filing
date. Thus, notice would be as timely as it is in the current regime,
but there would now be enough time to allow for substantive
examination. The first published document (if it publishes at all)
would therefore not be the originally filed application, but an
application that has undergone at least some examination. This is a
more radical approach,229 and an empirical study is likely necessary
to evaluate if it correctly balances the costs and benefits of
publishing unexamined patent applications. But this paper
provides an initial theoretical underpinning of the reasoning for
this approach.
Examining applications before publication would encourage
more filers to abandon their lower-quality applications before the
eighteen-month publication deadline. These abandoned
applications would consequently not be allowed to illegitimately
occupy patent idea space. There is evidence that this would work:
because many inventors do not perform any prior art search before
filing an application,230 even one round of rejections may convince
some applicants that the prior art the examiner finds cannot be
overcome. For example, at the European Patent Office, at least six
percent of applicants withdraw their applications after getting the
preliminary search results from the examiner.231 In the United
States, over ten percent of applications abandon their application
after an initial rejection from the examiner.232
228. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 1, at 70–71.
229. See, e.g., Peter G. Dilworth, Some Suggestions for Maximizing the Benefits of the
Provisional Application, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 233, 233 (1996) (reciting benefits
of the earlier filing date provided by provisional applications); Sean B. Seymore, Patent
Asymmetries, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 963, 1014 n.347 (2016) (“[T]he provisional patent provides
an easy and inexpensive mode of entry into the U.S. patent system.”); MERGES & DUFFY, supra
note 1, at 70 (“Provisional applications could be thought of as somewhat simpler and cheaper
versions of a regular application.”).
230. See supra note 105.
231. George Lazaridis & Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, The Rigour of EPO’s
Patentability Criteria: An Insight Into the “Induced Withdrawals”, 29 WORLD PAT. INFO. 317, 317,
320 (2007) (a total of 30% of applications are withdrawn, with 20% of those withdrawn after
the initial search report; 30% x 20% = 6%).
232. Letter from Ron Katznelson, supra note 227, at App’x p.13.
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Further, the applications that are published would go through
at least some examination before publication. This may result in
some narrowing of the claims to a more realistic scope, and to a
reduction in the number of published claims. In fact, contrary to the
view of some legal scholars,233 examination does bring about
meaningful change to applications. In sixty-nine percent of
applications resulting in issued claims, the applicant will have
made an amendment altering one or more elements in the main
independent claim as a result of examination.234 Combining this
with another study that shows that granted patent claims are on
average forty-five words (or about forty percent) longer at grant
than publication,235 there is strong empirical evidence that
examination actually leads to meaningfully narrower claims.
Empirical studies also show that examination may sometimes
cause applicants to completely abandon certain independent
claims, as granted patents on average lose 0.4 independent claims
between publication and issuance.236
If the examiner can successfully reject a claim based on
insufficient disclosure or vagueness,237 claims that do publish might
not just be of narrower scope but may also incorporate more
structure. This may ameliorate some of the problems plaguing
many patent disclosures: functional and abstract claiming. In
extreme cases, if there is an egregious lack of support of the claims
in the specification, the PTO could even reserve the right to decline

233. Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY
L.J. 181, 181–82 (2008) (discussing the view that “far from serving as an effective gatekeeper,
the PTO is effectively rubber-stamping private efforts to seek immunity from competition”);
Lemley, supra note 184, at 1495 n.1 (2001) (“The PTO has come under attack of late for failing
to do a serious job of examining patents, thus allowing bad patents to slip through
the system.”).
234. Andrew F. Christie, Christ Dent & John Liddicoat, The Examination Effect: A
Comparison of the Outcome of Patent Examination in the US, Europe and Australia, 16
J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 21, 28, 31 (2016) (Figure 4 shows that examination resulted
in an “integral change” in the first claim in 69% of applications).
235. Alan C. Marco, Joshua D. Sarnoff & Charles A. deGrazia, Patent Claims and Patent
Scope 13 (USPTO Off. of Chief Economist, Econ. Working Paper No. 2016-04, 2016),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2844964. Claims are on average approximately 111 words long
at publication, and an addition of forty-five words thus represents a forty percent increase.
Id. at Table 3.
236. Id. at 13.
237. “Vagueness” can refer to an indefiniteness rejection or a rejection of a functional
claim. See supra text accompanying notes 98–100.
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to publish some applications in their entirety. For example, if no
actual working examples or structures are provided.
Proposals from other scholarly work that focus generally on
improving patent examination can also be informative in the prepublication examination context. Such proposals include providing
examiners more time to review applications238 and with
incentives239 and tools240 to look at the applications more closely in
the first instance.
b. Super-divisional requirement. The above solution would only
fix the problem of overbroad claiming in applications, and not the
problem of speculative disclosure in the rest of the document. In an
even more radical pre-publication examination approach, the PTO
may consider imposing requirements to “clean up” the rest of the
written description before it publishes. The length and number of
inventions in patent documents makes searching through them
difficult. Market participants cannot predict what a certain
disclosure will produce in terms of claims, and applicants can
dump all sorts of things in the application, in an attempt to create
“spoiler” prior art or in anticipation of future amendments.
Currently, examiners have the ability to require applicants to
split up the claims of a submitted application into multiple
applications (called “divisionals”) if the examiner finds that there
are multiple inventions disclosed.241 However, the same
specification follows all these different divisional applications—
three identical specifications are published for different claim sets.
But if a reform can create a delay in publishing an application,
examiners may be able to force the applicant to split up their claims
and their specification into separate applications—one per each

238. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 102, at 981, 985 (providing empirical evidence
that greater time allotment to examiners improves quality of output).
239. Steven M. Reid & Courtenay C. Brinckerhoff, New Patent Office Examination
Procedures: Bane or Boon?, 79 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 173, 174 (2009)
(discussing a change in the internal achievement metric structure that would incentivize
examiners to spend more time on a new application).
240. Freilich, supra note 10, at 33–36 (proposing new information-forcing tools
for examiners).
241. 35 U.S.C. § 121 (“If two or more independent and distinct inventions are claimed
in one application, the Director may require the application to be restricted to one of
the inventions.”).
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filed invention—forcing them to file them simultaneously (if at
all).242 This would be a type of super-restriction requirement.243
The super-restriction requirement should result in shorter,
more focused applications. The divided applications would
perhaps result in fewer claim amendments and continuations
because the specifications would be more narrowly focused on each
claim set. Filers would maybe choose not to pursue certain lowervalue (or “spoiler”) inventions at all, to avoid immediately paying
additional fees for the different divisional applications.
The super-divisional requirement also has the benefit of putting
the decision partly in the hands of the applicant, who may be in a
better position to decide the value of their application at the time of
filing.244 If an examiner also performs an initial prior art search
before requiring restriction, both the examiner and the filer would
have more information about whether a restriction is appropriate
and what inventions are worth pursuing.
A scheme to avoid abuse, where an applicant cannot just file the
same specification for each application, may need to be devised.
Intelligent concept searching could assist with this. If nothing else
works, capping the length of divisional specifications would
provide a rough stopgap on abusive tactics.
c. Sticking points. One glitch with this particular early
examination scheme is the elimination of the provisional
application. For one, this solution may require the involvement of
other WTO countries in order to work fairly.245
A bigger potential problem with this early examination scheme
is that U.S. applicants would lose the cheap hold period of
242. Or risk losing the filing date for each invention.
243. Strangely, the PTO seems to have interpreted the “independent and distinct”
statutory language as “independent or distinct.” See MPEP, supra note 28, §§ 802.01, 803
(“Under the statute, the claims of an application may properly be required to be restricted to
one of two or more claimed inventions only if they are able to support separate patents and
they are either independent or distinct.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added)). This seems
to provide the PTO with sufficient discretion to expand the reach of restriction requirements.
244. Akin to a Pigouvian tax being preferable to a command-and-control regulation.
See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Toward a Pigouvian State, 164 U. PA. L. REV.
93, 95 (2015).
245. Otherwise, foreign applicants would still get the benefit of their earlier,
unexamined, foreign-filed placeholder applications since many other countries have a
provisional application system as well. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 1, at 70–71. The
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provisionals, a period they currently use to consider whether to
pursue their inventions further.246 This loss is arguably a positive
side-effect, however, as the scheme would reduce the filing of more
speculative, uncertain inventions. Reducing filing of poor-quality
inventions, and having some sort of pre-publication examination,
might elevate the status of U.S. applications that do end up being
published, as compared to foreign-filed ones. Applicants would be
able to monetize this elevated status, by enticing investors or in
warning competitors, for example. This could compensate for the
loss of provisional placeholders and encourage filing in the
United States.
Moreover, there is a potential argument that applicants should
not be able to have a “placeholder” application if they have not yet
developed an idea worth patenting. If, under the proposed prepublication examination system, an applicant attempts to cheat by
filing an application they have no intention of immediately
prosecuting, then the PTO can develop ways to punish this
behavior. For example, they could deem an application abandoned
(and not publish it) if the applicant is not making a good faith effort
to respond to the examiner’s rejections.
d. An AI alternative. If the loss of provisional applications is seen
as too costly based on the discussion above, especially if the
problem of notice quality is found to be limited only to certain
technology sectors,247 a compromise would be to retain the
placeholder period but to run applications through an automated
screening system before they are allowed to be published. The
screening can require applicants to address certain issues and
amend the application accordingly. The use of AI in automating
examination is still in its infancy, but it shows great promise in

alternative is to delay publishing applications past eighteen months (perhaps something
other countries would be more willing to agree to) and implement the above proposal. Such
delay would result in other notice failures, however, such as reducing knowledge diffusion
and a lack of information to competitors about secret, blocking prior art.
246. For example, in 2011, 72,000 applicants decided to abandon their provisional
applications. Dennis Crouch, Abandoning Provisional Applications, PATENTLY-O (Jan. 2, 2013),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/01/abandoning-provisional-applications.html. And
reliance on provisionals in the United States is increasing. See Dennis Crouch, Percent of
US-Originated Patents that Claim Priority to a Provisional Application, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 17,
2017), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/10/originated-provisional-application.html.
247. See supra notes 216, 222.
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finding relevant prior art248 and spotting certain issues with claims,
such as indefiniteness.249 It can also easily find proposed objective
metrics corresponding to poor notice quality, such as a lack of
working examples, use of non-standardized terminology,250 or a
lack of correlation between claim and specification terms.251 In time,
AI could even be used to impose the supra-divisional requirement
I proposed above or to spot functional claim language. It is
doubtful, however, that AI will be able to replace human
examination for spotting issues with the sufficiency of the
disclosure in supporting claim scope, given the complexity of
that task.
In any case, if an AI system can be designed to accomplish even
a subset of the above tasks, the initial screening mechanism for
applications would still significantly improve their quality of
notice, perhaps without significant compromise in the timing of
their publication.
*

*

*

Pre-publication examination of patent applications can provide
a mechanism for reducing the incidence of overbroad claims and
speculative disclosures in the patent idea space. It can help
competitors perform more accurate FTO searches and would not
elevate disclosure of “chaff” to the level of highly cited prior art.
CONCLUSION
There is a cost to publishing unexamined patent applications.
Published applications create legal uncertainty for market
participants and permanently occupy the prior art idea space. Both
effects can deter research into new technology areas. In the interest
of transparency and timeliness, we have sacrificed quality of notice.
Providing the Patent Office and the applicant with the
incentives and information to improve (or perhaps abandon) the
patent document before it publishes would reduce the levels of
248. See generally Aaron Abood & Dave Feltenberger, Automated Patent Landscaping, 26
A.I. & L. 103 (2018) (describing a new approach to finding prior art that utilizes machine
learning with an initial human-selected set of patents).
249. Dean Alderucci, The Automation of Legal Reasoning: Customized AI Techniques for the
Patent Field, 58 DUQ. L. REV. 50, 76–81 (2020).
250. Id. at 79.
251. Id. at 78–79.
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“notice pollution” that applications contribute to the patent idea
space. There is room for reform, and the possibility of achieving
higher quality notice, without losing most of the benefits of timely
notice and transparency. An empirical study is needed to
determine the extent to which the notice failures created by
publishing unexamined applications harm innovation and to select
the appropriate level of reform.
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